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INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM OF THE THESIS 
The specific problem of this thesis is that of evil. Man 1 s 
sufferings, sins, and the natural catastrophes that weigh life 
down Will be considered in the light of the thought of three out-
standing personalists. The reasons for choosing this particular 
subject are many, _for example, the whole problem of evil and sin 
in the cultural milieu, the confused thought found associated 
with the problem, and the personal feelings and orientations of 
the writer to the problem. To be more explicit, it would appear 
that there are at least three outstanding reasons for considering 
this problem. 
First of all, evil is an empirical fact of this life; it is 
an undeniable reality. The Christian Scientists do attempt to 
deny evil, but promptly admit it again under the new name uerrore11 
Needless to say, they are still faced with the same problem under 
a new label. Second, attempts to deal with the p:t."'Dblem have in-
fluenced the thought of many philosophers, for example, Plato, 
Augustine, and Hume, and of course all theologians have dealt 
with it. Their attempts to answer it have brought forward many 
interesting theories concerning it. Some of the outstanding ones 
will be enumerated below. Finally (and most important), one can 
never completely orient himself to God until he has resolved this 
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problem. In the light of his own personal. experience of God he must 
strive for a workable hypothesis for the solution of the problem. 
It would appear that these reasons cover the main areas of life 
where evil is felt: :i.. ts presence in the historical and natural pro-
cess, the influence of evil on the thought of all, ru1d the necessity 
of facing it in one 1 s quest .for God. 
B. _SPECIFIC METHOD OF APPROACHING THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 
After some consideration of how specifically to approach the 
problem of evil, it became apparent that it would be impossible to 
deal With the problem wholesale. :Some thought was given to the pos-
sibility of choosing a representative writer from several different 
schools of philosophy and undertaking the discussion from the:i.r par-
ticular treatments of the problem. A little research, however, soon 
revealed that within any particular school of philosophy there were 
a number of proposed solutions to the problem of evil. It was then 
dec~ded to limit the discussion to one p~rticular school of philoso-
phy. Here again, however, research revealed that Within any so~called 
school oi' philosophy there were divergences oi' opinion. It was then 
finally decided to limit the discussion to the particular type of 
philosophy that has-been taught at Boston Uni.versity .for the past 
.three-quarters oi' a -centiiry. This school of philosophy goes under 
· the name of -personalism.:- There are other forms of personal.ism, and 
some of them will be ·.enumerated ·in the chapter on personalism. 
There are three basic reasons why personalism was selected as 
the school of philosophy to be-considered. In the first place, all 
Boston personalists have made religion an ~tegral part of their 
philosophy. Thus they have had to deal di-rectly with the problem of· 
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evil. This is not true to such a large extent o:f other American schools 
e:f philosophy. Second, the writer is studying at Boston University 
which can be rightfully called the 11_cradle of American personalism. u 
In .the third place, the writer t s philosophical leanings are towards 
personalism, and therefore, the writing of this thesis should help 
clear up-his thinking concerning the problem. 
c. BOME PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO TEE PROBLEM OF EVIL 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to indicate and evaluate all 
the hypotheses that have been proposed for the solution of the problem 
of evil. :Rather an attempt will be made to offer those solutions that 
would appear to show the wide range of thought resulting from the pro-
blem. Also this presentation should help orient the discussion to the 
particular problem o£ the thesis, 11 The Treatment of the Problem o:f Evil 
by Certain Personalists. 11 Brig~tman in his work A Philosophy of Reli-
gion lists ten traditional solutions that would appear to accomplish 
l 
this purpose. 
i. Probably the most common solution. that bas been of:fered for 
moral evil or sin is that it is the result of mants :freedom. The argu-
ment generally takes the :form that certainly no one would want to be 
a puppet on a string singing the praises of God without any say-so 
about it. Many writers say that God wants love £rom a man that is free-
ly given, and not the mechanical responses of a robot. Most criticisms 
of this proposed solution point out that all the mental anguish and 
1. Brightman, POR, 259-272. This and all other abbreviations are 
explained under the author• s name in the bibliography. 
suffering in the world is qUite a price to pay :for the privilege 
o:f loving, or not loving, God. 
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ii. A second view commonlyheld cis that nonmoral evils are the 
punishment for moral evils. The :feasability o:f this solution, o:f course, 
rests upon the morality o:f retributive justice.. However, saying that 
most enlightened social psychologists and ethicists do not believe that 
retributive justice is the answer to man 1 s social ills, it can hardly 
be said that retributive justice is God's way of disciplining his loved 
ones. O:f course, this theory is also based upon the assumption that man 
has already reached a solution to the problem of moral evil. 
iii. A third point of view -is that moral evils are disciplinary. 
In most cases, the advocates o:f this theory generally point out the 
many examples in life o:f suffering that have apparently enriched the 
character of a person or even a whole nation. It would appear, how-
ever, that this solution is inconsistent with a sj)ffiopic interpreta-
tion of experience. Certainly, there are many examples of suffering 
tbat have completely debased and ruined beyond recall a human person-
ality. 
iv. Another point of view is that evil is incomplete good. If 
one is willing to accept the supposition that he is merely a part o:f 
an aesthetic whole (like a single note in a symphony, or a dab o:f 
paint in a painting) that he cannot grasp due to his :finiteness, then 
this solution might have some merit. It could be that in the eyes o:f 
God all evil is incomplete good because he sees evil as the part of 
the wfl:ole, and not as an abstraction as :finite beings do. However, 
if human personality is the pinnacle of God1 s creation that it is be-
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lieved to be, how could a just God allow one personality to be a 
little less perfect than the next one, even if this imperfection is 
for the sake of the whole, es-pecially when the individual cannot ap-
preciate the whole? Certainly, every individual would have the right 
to ask: Why i~sn't it I instead of the next one who has that extra 
touch of goodness, beauty, or truth so that I, too, could lead a 
richer life? 
v. .A fifth way to interpret evil is to say that it is neces-
sary as a contrast to the good. Many have probably expressed this 
view at one time or another. They say what a monotonous world this 
would be if there were not the evil to contrast with the good. This 
interpretation of evil might have some me_ri t if there was only one 
supreme value experience in life and all the rest were subordinate 
to it. When it is recognized, however, that there are at least 
four value experiences on equal footing; it is realized that there 
is enough contrast in life without the necessity o£ evil. 
vi. ~Still other writers in the field of theology believe that 
both moraJ. and nonmoral evils are the result o.f man 1 s .freedom. This 
view is open to the same criticisms as the view that moral evil is 
the result o.f man 1 s .freedom. Here again, the same question can be 
raised as to why there is so much suffering and cruelty in the world~ 
even i.f it is attempted to attribute it to mant s .freedom, past or 
present. More will be said in subsequent parts o.f this thesis in re-
gard to the relationship o.f freedom to both natural evil and sin. 
vii. Still another point of view states that evil is needed .for 
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beings in the world other than man. Even if evil is needed for 
beings other than man (beings about which apparently nothing is 
known), the question still remains as to why God created two groups 
of beings that apparently have entirely different conceptions of 
values, and why God is justified in treating human persons largely 
as means to another end. 
viii. Some philosophers have tried to avoid the problem of 
evil by saying that it serves an unknown good. Here again, a mys-
terious sometlling is brought into the picture to solve the problem. 
The appeal to ignorance never solves any problem, least of all 
those in religion and philosophy. Whatever this unknown good is, 
it has never been experienced. The reality of evil, however, has 
been experienced, and a more philosophic explanation tha:i:J. this one 
is demanded. 
ix. Another point of view is that of the Christian Scientist: 
all evil is an illusion. If it is believed that evil is ilLusory, 
then it can also be argued that the good of life is illusory. It 
would appear, however, that it does no-b throw much light upon the 
problem of man 1 s suffering to call evil unreal or an error of mor-
tal mind- even errors have to be dealt with in li.fe. Besides, 
suffering is too common an experience of life to dismiss it as 
illusory. 
x. A final point of view that has been very popular in. some 
philosophical circles (for example, neo-realism, some forms of 
naturalism, and logical positivism), is the view that good and evil 
are the outcome of processes of entities that are axiological neu-
tral. A little reflection will show the unfruitfulness and inco~ 
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herence of this view. Certainly, it would have to be admitted 
that life is built around value experiences. In i'act, it is al-
most impossible to make any judgment in life that does not re-
flect some value judgment. It appears very incoherent to attempt 
to explain the building stones o.f life (value experiences) in ter.m.s 
of axiological neutral processes_, for example, neutral entities. 
The main purpose in presenting these solutions has been to 
indicate some of the vital questions surrounding the problem of 
evil. It is hoped that by considering the problem as it is dealt 
with by three outstanding personalists, some o.f the confusion i'ound 
surrounding the problem in the above discussion will be clarified. 
Oi' course, it is entirely possible that some of the same errors 
noted above will be found in the thought of the men under considera-
tion. It is still hoped, however, that the discussion ~~ lead to 
a more coherent solution of the problem. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF TEE'SIS 
1. .Philosophy of Personalism: The first chapter of the thesis 
will be a historical sketch of the· development of the philosophy of 
personalism with special emphasis on personalism as developed at 
Boston University, starting with Borden Parker Bmrne. It will point 
out how personalism deals with the basic categories of philosophy, 
and an attempt will be made to define personalism in the light of the 
thought of Bowne, Knudson, and Brightman. Of course, these men do not 
agree completely on all phases of their thought, but there is enough 
agreement to warrant expectation of a general workable definition of 
· personalism. 
2. Personalists to be Discussed in Theses: The thought of three 
personalists has been chosen as the topic of this thesis. These 
three men can be called the corner-stone of Boston personalism. 
First, Borden Parker Bowne's views on evil. will be considered. 
This discussion will be i'ollowed by an analysis oi' the views on 
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evil oi' Bowne's two outstanding students, Albert Cornelius Knudson 
and Edgar :Shef.field Brightman. Each o.f these writers has shown .firm. 
religious convictions; and has been deeply concerned about the pre-
ble~ o.f evil. Knudson and Brightman have written exhaustive works 
on the problem of evil, and Bowne has expi'S:ssed h:imsel.f very .for-
cibly in some o.f his works on it. Although they have the same gen-
eral philosophical frame o£ re.ference, there is enough divergence in 
their thought and in their treatment o.f evil to make .for a .fruitful 
discussion. 
3. Exact Procedure to be Followed: The procedure will be to 
consider the thought o.f eachwriter separately. In the case o.f each 
writer, what would appear to be his basic metaphysical or theological 
position will be outlined. This is necessary if all the implications 
o.f his treatment o.f evil are to be understood. In particular, the 
problem of evil ~s in.fluenced the philosophical thinking oi' the men 
to be considered. O.f course, where it is feasible, similarities and 
contrasts between the writers will be noted. 
Also, the following two basic forms o.f criticisms -will be em-
ployed in detennining the adequacy o.f the treatment of evil by the 
men considered. First, is the final view on evil consistent with the 
other metaphysical or theological conclusions (internal criticism)? 
For example,. has the writer been complete~y consistent in his 
methodological approach? The other f'orm. of' criticism will be of' 
an external nature: Has the particular pos~tion under considera-
tion squarely f'aced all the f'aets (particularly :the ev:ll ones) of' 
existence? In o-ther words, as f'ar as this thesis is concerned, 
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does the f'inaJ. view- on evil appear to of'f'er a coherent interpreta-
tion of' evil in the light of' its avowed philosophical or theolo-
gieal position? 
The last chapter will be concerned with a concluding analysis 
of' the various solutions brought f'orward by the dif'f'erent writers, 
and an attempted synthesis of the varieus view-s will be presented. 
It is hoped that the f'inal synthesis will bring out the best of' each 
writer• s thought, and at least point a tentative f'inger toward what 
cru1 b~ ?onsidered the best of' the .Possible solutions to the problem 
of evil. To borrow a f'igure of' speech f'rom Brightman 1 s A Philosophy 
of' Religio~ .. 1 used in a slightly clif'ferent context, this V'li ll only 
be ualt solution to the problem of evil, 11 then solution, of' course, 
being known only by GOd. 
1. Brightman, POR, Preface, vii. 
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CHA.PTER I 
PHILOSOPHY OF PERSONALISM 
The pu:rpose o:f ·this chapter is to give a short historical 
sketch o:f the development o:f personalism as a philosophy, and to 
:ind:icate the basic position o:f personalism in regard to traditional 
theism, metaphysics, epistemology, and religion. 
A. HISTORICAL SKETCH OF PERDONALISM 
The main concern here is with the philosophical use o:f the 
term personalisn. It is beyond the scope o:f this thesis to attempt 
to indicate personalistic elements in the nphilosophical greats11 o:f 
the past. The use o:f the term personalism to indicate a philosophi-
cal position is comparatively young.1 Schleiermacher was apparently 
the :first one to use the term personalism (as equivalent to theism) 
in his :famous Reden published in 1799. I~ was, however, some time 
after this before the term personali&ll was used to de:f:ine a philo-
soph:ical system. Jolm Grote was apparently the :first one to use 
the term in England (in 18 6.5) • Walt Whitman :first used it in 
America in his essay 11Personalism11 in the Gal§.?CY (1868). The word 
next appeared in Charles Renouvier 1 s work entitled Le Personnalisme 
(1903). Soon after this, there appeared in 1906 William Stern's 
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work called Person 1md Bache (Person and Thing). 
In 1901 there appeared a work entitled The Limits of Evolution by 
1. Brightman, Art. (194.5), 576. 
2. Knudson, POP, 17-21. ·Also see Brightman, Art. (194.5), .576; and 
Art. (19.50), 340-344. 
G. W. Howison, of the University of California, in which the term. 
"personal idealism" was used. In 1902 this same_ tenn, lfPersonal 
Idealismn, was the title of' a group of essays published at Oxford 
University. The most important of these essays :from a philosophi.,. 
cal point of view was that on 11Personality; Human and Divine, u by 
H. Rashdall. Apparently, Bovme was the .first one to use the term. 
personalism in English as the title o.f a book with the appearance 
of his Personalism in 1908. Mary Calkins also introduced the use 
of the term at about the same time in her Persistent Problems of 
Philosophy (second revised edition, 1908). 
J;t is interesting to note that within a very brief period of 
time at the turn of the century, in Germany, France, and America 
the term personalism appeared as the name of a philosophical posi-
tion. Despite the .fact that personalism. has been only in use for 
approximately half a century as a philosophical concept, the men 
who have approached the many philosophical problems from the per-
sonalistic position have helped to clear up much confused thinking 
in the fields of metaphysics, epistemology,- and problems in the 
religious field, including, of course, the problem of evil. 
ll 
Personalism, on the whole, has been -very benei'icial and sympa-
thetic to Christianity and theism. Like most schools oi' philosophy, 
however, there have been varieties of opinion in personalism. They 
have taken the fonn of atheistic personalism (McTaggart), pantheistic 
personalism (W. :Stern), absolutistic personalism (Hegel, Royce, and 
Calkins, relativistic personalism (Renouvier), teleological person-
alism (Howison), and realistic personalism (Aristotelian Thomism, 
l2 
deistic dualism, and "religious realismn as ~xemplified by D. D. 
Macintosh, J. B. Pratt, and A. 0. Garnett). These different 
schools of personalism will not be mentioned again; they hci.ve been 
1 
listed merely to ihdicate the wide range of personalistic thinking. 
rn this thesis the discussion will be limited to theistic, ideal-
isroic personalism, which is the main contribution of the personalists 
discussed. It should be noted that hereafter whenever the word per-
sonalism is used, it will rei'er to the philosophical position of the 
three men under discussion, unless otherwise specified. 
B. RELATION OF PERSONALISM TO TRADITIONAL THEISM 
Theistic personalism in general has its roots in the thought 
of five men. On the whole, it can be said that it owes its spirit-
ual individualism and activism to Leibniz, its immaterialism to 
Berkeley, its epistemology and ethical conceptions to Kant, its con-
crete wholeness to Hegel, and its first really distinctive fo~ula­
tion to Lotze. In Bowne is found a continuation of the Lotzean train 
of thought; thus Bowne's personalism is in general agreement with tra-
cl.itional theism. Knudson points out three points of agreement and 
three points of disagreement with traditional theism that are worth 
2 
noting. First, personalism agrees with such theism regarding the 
absoluteness of God. Absolute here means that God is the creator of 
all, and is dependent on no external reality. This does not in any 
way deny the freedom oi' man. God has provided i'or the freedom oi' man 
1. Knudson, POP, 21-75. 
2. Knudson, POP, 62-67. 
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by his own self-limitation; and,_of course, he is also limited by 
his own nature. Personalism also agrees with traditional theism in 
that it makes the creation of persons a free act of God; thus the 
personal world is not a part of God, but has an objectivity and 
otherness apart from God. The third point of agreement with tradi-
tional theism is in its dualistic epistemology. 
There are also three very important points of disagreement with 
traditional theism. The first is personalism r s idealistic view of 
nature. The material world is merely a phenomenal order maintained 
by a spiritual causality! Another point of disagreement is the fact 
that personalism finds the ontological real in personality. Tradi-
tional theism with its realistic bias has always been somewhat con-
fused at this point. A third and very important disagreement with 
traditional theism has to do with the personalistic belief in the 
Kantian conception of the practical reason. It must be noted, how-
ever, that this practical reason applies to all areas of life, not 
just the moral areas as it did for Kant. No belief can be absolutely 
demonstrated for personalism, not even the belief in God. 
Next, the metaphysical and epistemological positions of person-
alism and also its relationship to religion will be considered. Of 
course, it must be recognized that in the individual writers that are 
~aken up in this thesis, there is disagreement on some of these points. 
' However, this will be just a preliminary survey to orientate the dis-
cussion to personalism in general; the discussion will be limited to 
essential points of agreement among the three men concerned. 
C. METAPHYSICAL POSITION OF BOSTON PERSONALISM 
It can be said that the metaphysical position o.f personalism:_ 
l 
can be summed up in the word personality or consciousness. This 
is because it is actually to divine or human personality that it 
looks i'or the ultimate ontological and cosmologioal explanations of 
the world o.f experience. This may sound at first like an easy way 
to avoid metaphysical and epistemological problems; but when the mat-
ter is looked into a little more closely, it becomes apparent that 
perhaps personality is the only adequate explanation of these problems. 
1. Ontology: Ontology is concerned with the ultimate defini-
tion of being. The concern here is not with any abstract being nor 
with the phenomenality of sense experience. Rather, the concern is 
with the ultimate explanation o:f being, change and identity, casual-
ity, and the world-ground. For the personalist, this explanation lies 
in the activity of the personality o:f God which is understood in the 
light o:f the :functioning o:f human personality. 
2. Cosmology: Cosmology is concerned with how being is organized 
into the :forms o.f space, time., matter, force, and motion o:f this par-
ticular cosmos. With the advent o:f modern physics there have been 
many attempts to explain this particular cosmos as a space-time con-
tinuum. with matter being the basic ontological principle operating in 
this continuum. Without a doubt, this is true o:f the phenomenal world; 
but, :for the personalist, to use this fact as an ontological explana-
tion is hypostqtizing of the worst sort. For him the cosmological 
1. The views expressed here are based upon readihgs in Knudson 1 s 
POP, Bowne 1 s PER and MET, and Brightman's ITP. 
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scheme becomes meaningful ~'~hen -viewed only as the result of the ac-
tivity of divine personality. He admits that the problems are diffi-
cult to explain on any theory, nbut it seems less incomprehensible on 
the assumption that the mutual responsiveness of mind to 1matter 1 
and of 1matter 1 to 1matter 1 are all cases of interpersonal connnunica-
tion between mind and mind. nl Certainly, human personality is more 
than energy in a space-time continuum; at least it is never exper-
ienced in any such manner. Thus, personalism accepts this space-time 
continuum. as true of the phenomenal world, that is, the world o.f 
sense. It does not, however, accept it as a metaphysical principle 
of ultimate reality, that is, the world of persons. 
3. Rational Psychology: futional psychology is concerned with 
the metaphysical interpretation of the mind. It can be said that the 
metaphysical basi~ of personalism is rational psychology. It is appar-
ent from the discussion of the metaphysics of personalism, so far, that 
the norms of the mind and the concrete unity of personality are the 
ultimate explanation of both the ontological and phenomenal realities. 
Personalists in their metaphysical interpretation of the mind are con-
cerned with the norms of the mind, the categories of thought, and the 
freely willing, value-experiencing person that everyone is. 
4. Rational Theology: ·Rational Theology can be defined as coher-
ent thinking about God. It takes no acco<IDt of revelation, at least 
revelation in the traditional sense as dogmatic revelation. By dog-
matic revelation is meant the communication o.f infallible truths from 
God to man. Rational theology is concerned with a dynamic rave-
1. Brightman, Art. (1950), 347. 
lation of God where God reveals ltbnself through man1 s spiritual 
growth and experiencing of values.1 Man is encouraged to go fur-
ther :in his search for God with God guiding him through spiritual 
help, such as that received through prayer, worship and all the 
intrinsic values of life. 
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5. .A.x:iology: Axiology is. concerned with the theory and valid-
ity of values. Although other modern schools of philosophy, besides 
personalism, have faced the problems of axiology and have attempted 
to allow for the importance of values, many of them have found them-
selves in the difficult position of attempting to account for value 
in a world that is ult:imately not of the nature of value. For ex-
ample, although the modern materialist allows for the importance of 
values for human living, their psychological existence has no meta-
physical import. Personalism, on the oth~r hand has been directly 
concerned with values; and assures them a metaphysical status in its 
recognition of personality, the locus of all values, as the ontological 
real. 
D. THEORY OF KNOlJIILEOOE 
Personalism has four basic tenets in i.ts theory of knowledge. 
First, it is dualistic: the idea and object are not the same. Second, 
it recognizes the creativity of the mind, and, thirdly, is rational-
istic in that it trusts and has faith in reason. Finally, personalists 
argue that all lmowledge rests on faith, and thus; the pri.macy of the 
practical reason. Knudson points out that although these four points 
are not peculiar to personalism, they do form a unique and coherent 
body of doctrine that is personalism1 s particular contribution to 
"2 
epistemology. 
l. Brightman, POR, 176. 
2. Knudson, POP, 99. 
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_E. PERSONALISM AND RELIGION 
Brightman notes that 11 the predo:m:inate Christian theology 
l-
is theistic personalism. n On the whole, personalism has appeared 
:L.J. religion as a liberal, 11modemisticn force, and has defended 
the concept of an omnipotent God (Bom1e, Knudson, Rall, Buckham, 
Flewelling, Wilson, Youtz, Calkins, Sorley, Temple, Pratt). More 
recently, however, the concept of a God whose will is limited 
by factors not created by his will has appeared (Rashdall, Bright-
man, Tsanoff, Hartshorne, Parker, Stace, Harkness, Berdyaev, Berg-
son, Tillich, Bertocci). 2 In general, personalists agree on the 
personality of God (M'Taggart excepted), a teleological interpreta-
tion of events, the synoptic method, the objectivity of ideal 
values, and an emphasis on ethical and social BA'})erience. On the 
whole, it can be argued that personalists have presented a view 
of God that is in keeping with all the experiences of man and, 
yet, is still religiously adequate. 
l. Brightman, Art. (1945), 576. In general, this discussion is 
based upon this article. 
2. This problem of the relation of God 1 s omnipotent will on the 
one hand to apparently surd evil factors, on the other, is 
one of the basic, if not the basic, points that must be 
faced in any discussion of the problem of evil. See in par-
ticular the final chapter of this thesis. 
lB 
CHAPTER II 
BOWNE 1 'S TREATMENT OF EVIL 
The following basic points will be emphasized in this critique 
of BoVine 1 s treatment of evil. First, an outJ.ine of Bowne 1 s method-
ological procedure will be presented. It is believed that this out-
line will reveal both rationalistic and pragmatic strands in his 
methodology. Furthermore, the pragmatic strand will be seen to be 
primarily concerned with the moral and religious problems of life, 
and still further, it will appear that this pragmatic approach to 
the field of moral and religious belief can be shown to be primarily 
the result of the factor of evil in human existence. Second, Bowne's 
three basic arguments for the theistic hypothesis will be considered. 
These arguments will indicate the rationalistic bent in his thought. 
They will be followed, thirdly, by a discussi:on of the Divine Nature 
that mil be concerned with the metaphysical attributes of God, 
and once· more, the rationalistic strand Will be apparent. Fourth, 
the Divine Will of God, his ethical and religious nature, will be 
presented. This presentation will bring the discussion to the center 
of the problem of evil. Also, as has been indicated above, it will 
be seen that Bowne's shift from a rationalistic to pragmatic method-
ology is primarily the result of evil. Finally, Bowne 1 s treatment oi' 
the problem of evil will be evaluated in the light of this double-
methodological approach to the problems of theology. 
A. BOWNE 1 S METHODOLOGY 
A perusal of the works of Bowne· reveals that be uses two distinl.¢t 
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methods, both empirically grounded..:- the rationalistic and the 
pragmatic. MOst investigators and critics of Bowne's thought 
have recognized these two distinct strands of method, .and have 
generally attempte,d to interpret one in the light of the other. 
Some have sought to harmonize the two methods under the concept 
of reason, -while others have sought to do the same under the con-
cept of practical experience. Ramsdell in his dissertation 
Pragmatic Elements in the Epistemology of Borden Parker Bowne 
reaches the conclusion that Bowne did not succeed in bringing these 
two elements together in his thought.1 
The basic question that must be answered in determining whether 
Bowne succeeded in reconciling these two basic elements in his 
thought, centers around the factor of whether he succeeded in iden-
tifying his doctrine of the determinative character of the interests 
and feelings of the mind with the Kantian doctrine of the practical 
reason. As just noted, Ramsdell believes (probably correctly) that 
Bowne failed in this attempt) and, consequently, has this basic con-
flict in his thought. It would appear, however, that Ramsdell failed 
to consider the specific factor in Bowne •s thought that brings out 
this point most clearly, his treatment of evil., To insure complete 
understanding of the rationalistic and pragmatic strands in Bowne's 
thought, it will be necessary, first of all, to present what he con-
siders to be the nature and scope of knowledge. 
l. The Nature and Scope of Knowledge: In the first place, 
l. See Ramsdell, PEE, 157-158. 
..,. 
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it must be noted that Bowne approaches the problem of knowledge from 
a dualistic posiuon. 
From the standpoint of ·the Absolute, _ things 
may possibly be conceptions,; but from the human stand-
point, it is impossible to identify things without 
conceptions. Their conceptional existence in our 
thought is not their real existence. They do not 
begin to exist when we conceive them, nor do they 
cease to be -when we go to sleep. From the human 
standpoint; then, ther! is an ineradicable dualism 
of thought'and things. 
More important for this thesis, however, is his distinction 
between knowledge and belief. Bovme defines knowledge as follows: 
If we thus distinguish lmowledge and belief, 
knowledge must be defined as that -which is self-
evident in the nature of reason, or which is 
immediately given in experience, ~r which is 
cogently inferred from the given. 
Thus, for Bowne, only logic arid mathematics and the facts of 
conscious exper-ience can be strictly called knowledge:, it is only 
here that certainty exists. From this defini.tion it is obvious 
that for Bowne only a small part of man 1 s convictions can right-
fully be called knowledge. Belief is defined as follOVfs: 
The general character of rational belief, 
in distinction from knowledge, is that it is a 
conviction based on reasons that lend some sup-
port, but do not compel it. T~ese may make it 
probabl~r, but do not prove it. 
Still more important for the problem of evil is Bowne's 
division of rational beliefs into those that have objective grounds 
1. Bowne, TTK, 296. Also'see 15-16 and 110. Hereafter, unless 
otherwise indicated, all quotations in this chapter will be 





Also see FT, 295-296; and SIT, 13-15. 
Also see Art.(l888), 99; and SIT, 13-14. 
and those that have subjective grounds. The former are the be-
lief's of science and philosophy and do not appeal to subjective 
interests. The latter are based upon the interests and feelings 
o:f each person and represent the great- catholic interests of man-
kind, for example, manr s moral and religious beliefs. 
The grounds o:f belief may be subjective and 
objective. Many belie:fs mcike no appeal to subjective 
interest; and their grounds may be objectively set 
:forth. This is the case with most scienti:fic be-
liefs, and with matters of historical fact. Such 
belie:fs so :far as they are rational, are based upon 
objective facts and evidence •••• But many belie:fs 
are not this objective in their grounds. They have 
their roots in feeling and our system of mental in-
terests. Their grounds, then, cannot be objectively 
presented, but must be sought rather in life itself.l 
At another point, Bowne bas this to say concerning this division 
of rational belief. 
We may say, then, w:i.th sufficient accuracy 
for our purpose, that the grounds of belief may 
be objective and subjective. The former are the 
facts o:f sense-perception; the latter are the 
manifold :facts o:f :feeling and instinct, and long-
ing for the true, the beautiful and the good, 
the sense of dependence and moral obligation, 
the desire to worship, and the .fervors of reli-
_g_ious aspiration.2 ---- - --
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This division that Bowne makes between knowledge and objective be-:-
lief and subjective belief points to both the rationalistic and prag-
matic elements in his thought.. The rationalistic element will now 
be investigated further. 
1. TTK, 369. 
2. SIT, 62-63, emphasis added. Also sea Art. (1884), 649. 
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2. Bowne 1 s Rationalism: The tenn. Rationalism has been used in 
various ways, and to 1ll1derstand its applicability to Bpwne 1 s thought, 
1 
these dif£erent meanings m~st be distinguished. It is possible to 
distinguish three meanings OI the term rationalism. in the history OI 
philosophical thought. In the £irst place, it can refer to the a 
priori method ilin philosophy by which the ultimate principles o£ real-
ity are deduced £rom a few basic concepts, definitions, and axioms, 
£or example, the philosophical method of Spinoza or Leibniz. Bowne 
was certainly not a rationalist in this meaning of the term. This was 
what he called the method o£ rigor and vigor and o£ten referred to it 
as closet logic. At one point, he says concerning this a priori me-
thod: HThis question is not to be anSVfered by any~ priori specula-
tion, no matter how pretentious, but by an inductive consideration o£ 
the mind itself. 112 
In the second place, rationalism can refer to the Kantian doctrine 
of the creativity o:f the mind: lmowledge is the result o.f the mind 
working over sensuously presented data. Or, thirdly, the term can re-
£er to a trustworthiness o.f the mind and the intelligibility of the 
real world. These two meanings o.f the term rationalism can be applied 
to Bowne 1 s thought. In regard to the creativity o.f the divine mind, 
£or Bowne, the physical .world results from its constant activity. As 
for the creativity o:f the human mind, he has this to say in the preface 
to his Theory o£ Thought and Knowledge: 11 The root thought o.f the work 
is that thought is an organic activity which un.folds .from within, and 
1. These three de£initions o.f the ter.m are based upon the def.initions 
given in Baldwin, DPP. 
2. Art. (1874), 463. 
can never be put together mechanically- f'rom w:ithout.n~ And still 
earlier in his writings: ''No fact in psychology is more clearly 
established than that the mind is active in all knowledge.n 2 
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In regard to the trustworthiness of' the mind and intelligibility 
of' the real world, he says: TIThe trustworthiness of' reason is the 
. 3 
presupposition of all speculation.'' And still further: 
Our interpreting activity presupposes the 
intelligibility and hence the rationality of 
all existenceo It presupposes that the objec-
tive reality is cast in the molds of' thought, 
so that the irrational is the impossible.4 
It must be hastily pointed out, however, that Bowne believed 
that much post-Kantian rationalism was extravagant and excessive 
in that it assumed human reason and human insight as the norms of 
rationality. He goes on to say, concerning rationality, that it 
nis not something actually discerned in experience, but an ideal 
believed in. u5 He then makes his position clear by stating: 
We still believe in the universality of 
rational law; but we are far from being so 
sure that we have fully comprehended it. We 
still believe in the interpretability of facts; 
but we are seldom able to say that we have 
reached a final interpretation. The only thing 
that is fixed is that nothing can be allowed 
which contradicts the laws of thought; but this 
leaves a great many possibilities open, and 
which of these laws have been realized cannot be 
learned by a priori ref'lection, but only by 
experience.- It still remains our faith that the 
.absolute reason at the center of things sees all 
things in rational connections; but our reason is 
neither absolute nor at the center.6 
1. TTK, 111. 4. Art.(1888), 99. 
2. Art.(l874), 462~ 
3. POT, 112. 
5. Art.(l888), 100. 
6. Art.(l888), 100. 
Thus, for Bowne, the rationality of the world is a controlling 
ideal, and only postulates or hypotheses can be made concerning 
this world. 
3. Bowne's Pragmatism.: Following Ramsdell 1 s general out-
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line, the pragmatic elements in Bowne t s thought as they appear in 
his conception of the nature o:f mind, his method of validating the 
general cognitive postulates of science and philosophy, his methods 
and criteria of· moral and religious belief's, his belief in the in-
strumentality of the basic interests o:f the mind, and his approach 
l 
to the nature o:f truth, will be considered. 
The pragmatic element in Bowne t s thought in regard to the nature 
of mind is apparent when he refers to it as an organic whole of 
interests and feelings which outline and control one's mental devel-
opment and determine one 1 s fundamental beliefs. 
The mind is not a disinterested logic-
machine, but a living organism, with manifold 
interests and tendencies. These outline it~ 
development, and :furnish the driving power. 
Bowne also appealed to pragmatic principles in his validating 
o:f the general postulates o:f science and philosophy. He believed 
these belief's were the result of the basic cognitive interests of 
the mind. It must be pointed out, however, that although he be-
lieved that these postulates were the result o:f what he called the 
cognitive interests of the mind_, he actually used rationalistic 
criteria in judg~g their adequacy; the validity of these beliefs 
1. Ramsdell, PEE, 137-158~ 
2. SIT, 19. Also see THE 22 and Art. (1884), 660. 
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rests upon their consistency and coherence. And still further, 
these beliefs rested upon what he called nobjective grounds." It 
is not necessary to appeal to a trwill to believen as it is in the 
case of moral and religious beliefs. 
As just indicated, it is in the field of moral and religious 
beliefs that Bowne definitely appeals to a pragmatic methodology. 
These are the beliefs that are based upon subjective grounds. It 
must be noted that the concern here is with the ethical and. reli-
gious nature of God, and not his metaphysical attributes which are 
not necessarily c«>ncerned with the God of religion. nBut the human 
mind in general, not content with a metaphysical conception of God, 
• 
has rather demanded a religious one. 111 The following quotation 
brings· out his pragmatism at this point a nThere is an element of 
faith and volition latent in all our theorizing. Where we cannot 
d t t ch . d 112 prove, we believe. Where we cannot emons ra e, we oose s~ es •. _ 
Bowne's final method in regard to these interests of the mind took 
the following form: 'rwhatever the mind demands for the satisfac-
tion of its subjective interests and tendencies may be assumed as 
. 3 
real, in default of positive disproof. 11 Of course, by positive 
disproof, Bowne meant either logical inconsistency (the rationalis-
tic element) or disproof based upon the failure of these interests 
to satisfy man's needs or what Bowne called practical absurdity 
(the pragmatic element). "The test of formal truth and error is the 
law of contradiction .••• The test of concrete truth and error is the 
I. THE, 248. 
2. POT, iii. 
3. THE, 18, emphasis added. 
law of absurdity. n1 And concerning the problem of evil: 
But we are moral beings also; and our moral 
interests must be recognized. Hence arises a 
moral ideal, which we join to the cognitive. The 
universe must be not only rational, but righteous 
at its roots. Here, too, we set aside the facts 
that make against our faith as something not yet 
understood. This is especially the ~in deal-
ing with the problem of evil.2 
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The above quotation brings out the essence of the oscillation 
in Bowne 1 s thought, his double-methodological approach to the 
problems of philosophy. In dealing with the cognitive ideal, as 
will be pointed out in the sequel, he continually appeals to 
rationalistic principles. However, his attempts to validate the 
moral and religious ideal are mostly of a pragmatic bent. The 
basic question can be raised: Why this shift in methodology? 
It would appear that a good part of the answer lies in the above 
quotation-the problem of evil. The above also brings out another 
example of Bowne 1 s pragmatism, the instrumentality of the basic 
interests of the mind. 
Finally, Bowne 1 s conception of the nature of truth l;las pragma-
tic overtones. At times he does conceive of truth as rational and 
independent, 11but the mind does not make it, it recognizes the 
truth. n3 The pragmatic overtones, however, appear in his criteria 
of workability and results. 11We conclude then, that it is not an 
objection to belief that its grocmds do not admit of satisfactory 








SITj 64-65. Also see Art.(l909-
l9lO·): 892. 
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matic element is also apparent in his conception of truth as fruit-
. 1 3 
ful, his criterion of survival, 2 and his 11will to believeu method. 
It is apparent from the above that the pragmatic elements in 
Bowne 1 s thought are primarily concerned with man 1 s re±igious nature; 
they are concerned with those beliefs based upon subjective grounds. 
And it would appear that Ramsdell is correct in his conclusion that: 
11 The pragmatic elements, therefore, have relevance aJJnost exclusively 
to the field of moral and religious belief. u4 
B. BOWNE 1S NATURAL THEOLOGY 
Brightman points out that natural theology can either be rational 
or empirical.5 Rational theology is the philosophical approach based 
on the belief that all true knowledge of God can be derived from fun-
damental elementary concepts inherent in the mind, for exain.ple, the 
ontological argument of God. Whereas., the empirica.J. approach attempts 
to give cognizance to all ak~erience and then tries to arrive at a 
coherent interpretation of God. From the nature of the discussion of 
Bowne•s methodology, it is apparent that he follows the empirical 
method and is not ·a rationalist in the above meaning. 
Bowne believes that the arguments for the intelligence of the 
world-grotUld fall into two general classes, inductive and speculative.6 
He divides the speculative arguments into the epistemological argument., 
that is, the argument from the nature and structure of reason, and the 
metaphysical argument, that is, the argument from the result of meta-
. 1. SIT, ll5. 
2. THE, 36-37. 
3. THE,, iv,l8. 
4. Ramsdell, PEE, 149 • 
5. Brightman, POR, 23. 
6. THE, 65. 
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physical criticism. The arguments will be considered in the above 
order. 
l. Inductive Argwnent for God: Bowne starts with the induc-
tive argument 'because in many respects it is more accessible to 
thought than the other two and is more easily understood.1 The argu-
ment is based upon co:nnnon sense realism, and knowledge about the world 
is taken for granted. Reflection upon the world as experienced points 
to three prominent facts that indicate the tenability of the theistic 
hypothesis: the system of order in nature, the purpose-like products 
in nature, and the existence of intelligent beings. 
a. Cosmological Argwnent: Probably the most common character-
istic of this world is its order, for example, the law of gravity, 
the laws of thermodynamics, and the basic physiological laws o£ the 
human body. Bowne believes that to account for this :fact, there is 
one o:f two hypotheses to which it can be appealed; that o:f intelli-
gence (self-directing reason) or that of non-intelligence (blind ne-
cessity). The first one points to the theistic hypothesis. It is n~t 
contradictory to the experience o:f order and law, and would appear to 
be the most coherent answer to the question of order in the universe~ 
In the case of the latter view, it is being argued that a blind power 
produces that which is intelligible and rational. 
This second hypothesis (based upon crude sense metaphysics) is 
the result of two misinterpretations of sense data. First, it is 
assumed that matter is seen as a cause in the m1iverse. Actually, 
l. THE, 67-122. 
no such cause is seen. The nature of cause is learned by infer-
ence from effects. Second, the descriptive laws of science are 
hypostatized, and then all else is subordinated under this hypos-
tatization. Laws have no existence per se, but are only descrip-
tive of events that take place. 
When we have said that the world-ground 
co-ordinates things by fixed rules of quantity 
and quality, and with perfect adaptation and 
numerical adjustment, wl have but stated the 
problem, not solved it. 
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Thus, it is apparent that the second hypothesis (that of non-intel-
ligence) is based on a sense-bound realism that is the result of un-
critical thought. It is only through an appeal to a basic living 
intelligence that the laws of nature become meaningful. 
b~ Teleological Argument: This argument is concerned with 
the evidence of design that is found in both the organic and inor-
ganic realms. In general, there are three basic arguments brought 
against a teleological interpretation of nature. 1. The mechanis-
tic principle is a better explanation of nature. 2. Although it 
appears ~ if nature followed a plan, it does not prove that it does. 
3. The analogy of purpose be-tween human activity and cosmic activity 
is only apparent and not real. These objections to the teleological 
argument will be discussed in this order. 
For Bowne, all mechanistic interpretations of nature are examples 
of intelligence explaining itself away. The human mind discovers 
certain laws in nature; it immediately hypostatizes these laws, and 
l. THE, 72• 
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ipso i'act_Q the world becomes a mechanistic process that explains 
all, including the intelligence that discovered the laws. Any at-
tempts to explain this mechanistic process only results in an ini'in-
ite regress. As Bowne points out, this explanation is only a 
Hbarren verbalism.u The world has been explained in terms of' verbal 
processes (symbols), and the whole problem of' eJdstence has been 
given a llfictitious simplicity.u The basic i'allacy of the class 
term or universal has been committeE!.. By this method, it becomes 
an easy matter to explain the complex by the simple. Class terms 
arrived at through logical deduction are used to explain both the 
deductive process and the resultant fact, the class term. 
Besides these basic logical oversights, there is also coni'used 
metaphysical thinking in all mechanical thinking. Basically, it 
is tacitly assumed that causes are known and that they are self~ 
explanatory. As has already been noted, however, this does not 
appear to be the case. 
In Bowne's time and also today, the theory of evolution has 
been the cause of' much coni'usion in both academic and popular 
thought. It is continually referred to as the example par excell-
ence that disproves the activity of God in nature and the necessity 
of' special creation. As Bolme puts it so cogently in discussing 
evolution as a theory of causality; urn this sense, evolution is 
simply a piece of bad metaphysics produced by bad logic.,lll Without 
a doubt, evolution is an apt d~cription of the natural process, 
l. THE . , 109. 
but it does not disprove purpose in nature. 
The second objection to the theistic hypothesis is the as if' 
objection: · the fact that the world-ground proceeds as if it had 
aims does not prove that it really has them. Again a telling 
quotation: 11We have in this objection a relic of the ancient 
fancy that atheism is sufficient~y established by disputing 
theism. n1 As Bowne points out, all objective knowledge is based 
on an as if. This as if applies to the mechanistic hypothesis 
as well as the theistic. The basic question is: lJVhich hypothe-
sis is the more coherent in the light of the facts? For Bowne, 
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all becomes blind necessity if the mechanistic hypothesis is fol-
lowed, including the mechanistic hypothesis. Such a methodology 
only ends in a complete skepticism and no explanation at all. 
The third objection, that there is too great a difference 
between cosmic and human activity to draw any conclusions f'rom one 
to the other, is based upon a faulty epistemology. In this view, 
the materialist suggests that the vastness and size of the universe 
indicates that it is beyond mind. The materialist forgets, hcwever, 
that this very vastness is discovered by mind, and that mind is mak-
ing new discoveries all the time. Here again, is an example of bond~ 
age to sense-bound empiricism. This point will be discussed further 
in the epistemological argument. 
c. Argument from Finite Intelligence: This argument is based 
upon the premise that the world must be mind-wise to be perceived by 
1. THE., 110. 
32 
mind. In his own life, man can form purposes and detennine his own 
conduct. Even if the mechanical interpretation of the universe was 
true, there would still be .finite intelligence. If this was the case, 
there would be a bifurcation of life, blind mechanism on the one 
hand (the universe) and living intelligence on the other (the finite 
self). However, the interaction between man and his environment is 
too common to believe that any such situation exists. The only al-
ternative is to posit a basal intelligence that founds the physical 
order and human intelligence is created in its image. 
2. Epistemological Argument: For Bowne, the two most :i:mpor-
tant arguments for the existence of God are the epistemological and 
the metaphysical arguments. The epistemological argument follows. 
First of all, he points out what he calls the 11 suicidal bearing of 
l 
atheism on the problem of knowledge." Either beliefs are based 
upon rational grounds, or they have no basis and are merely psycho-
logical events that arise from mechanistic causes. If all thought 
is merely the result of mechanistic principles, then truth and error 
have no meaning. The mechanist 1 s own argument for mechanism has no 
meaning if this premise is correct, for if all life is mechanistically 
determined, then so is this argument. 
Second, a little reflection reveals that all that is lmovm about 
the world is the result of the laws of thought. Thus, it is appar-
ent that if lmowledge is valid, then thought and thing must follow 
the same laws. For this to be true, the world-ground must be a basal 
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intelligence. 
It is interesting to note the strong rationalistic tone of the 
above arguments. . Bowne i's here dealing with beliefs grounded on 
objective .fact. There is no appeal to the t'will to believe11 or 
ttthe survival of the .fittestn (that is, the fittest belief). Bowne 
is appealing solely to such rational principles as consistency, the 
creativity of the mind, and the intelligibility of the real world. 
3. Metaphysical Argument: The main purpose of the metaphy-
sical argument is to show that the realistic notion of a world of 
things existing by themselves, tta prolific source of atheistic fan-
cies, tt is a questionable notion. 
Here metaphysics takes up and completes the 
argument .from epistemology by showing that the 
self-existent mechanical world on which atheism.· 
builds is a product of superficial sense think-
ing which understands neither itself nor its 
problem.l · 
First, Bowne points out that if space and time are extra.mentally 
real, then there is the problem of relating the world of thought (the 
) 2 only world known to the wor!d o.f space and time. The world of space 
and time becomes meaningful only when it is seen that the world of re-
lations and related objects exists only in and for thought. For exam-
ple, in the case of speech, space and time are the mediums through 
which the noise is communicated, but the meaning of this noise exists 
only in the mind. It is in the world of space and time that the 
world of ideas is translated into action, 11but in itself, and apart 
l. THE, 135 
2. THE, 135-137. 
I ,,~ 
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from this teleological function, the spatial and temporal is noth-
1 
ing articulate or intelligible. 11 
Second, due to the fact that the temporal flow is ceaseless and 
admits of infinite division, ideas must be fixed and timeless to ac-
2 
count for thought at all. If ideas were completely entailed in 
time, then a Heraclitic flux would result that would end in the com-
plete overthrow of knowledge. Therefore, the only way to account 
for thought is to say that the world of space and time is movement ac-
cording to ideas and exists for the setting forth of ideas. 3 
Also, the other categories of thought acquire meaning only when 
viewed in the light of living intelligence. For example: Change and 
identity become meaningful only when viewed in ·t,he light of mind: it 
is in the thought world that both change and identity are experienced. 
As has already been indicated, the only causality that is understood 
is the personal experience of causality in producing effects. Matter, 
force, and motion are confined phrases that describe phenomenal activ-
i ty, but they- become meaningful only when interpreted on the plane of 
living intelligence. Finally, nature becomes meaningful for thought 
only when viewed as the result of the activity of a basal monism that 
is living intelligence. 
1. THE, 137. 
2. THE, 137-138. 
3. It must be pointed out that there are certain apparent contra-
dictions in Bowne 1 s thought concerning the nature of time, for 
example, he speaks of the necessity of eternal and timeless 
ideas and yet defines being as activity without time, according 
to law. Is it possible to have any form of activity without 
time? There.is also an oscillation in his thought between a 
soul and a self-psychology. It WOllld not appear, however, that 
these inconsistencies have any direct bea:ring on the problem of 
the thesis. 
It seems plain that the belief in a free 
and intelligent ground of things is as well 
founded as any objective belief whatever, and 
that this belief is one which enters so inti-
mately into our mental life that philosophy 
and science, and even rationality itself 
stands or falls with it. For these reasons, 
we hold that the universe is founded in intel;.. 
ligence.1 
C. THE NATURE OF GOD 
In his discussion of the nature of God_, Bowne is still in the 
realm of objective belief/ and, consequently, the rationalistic 
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element in his thought is still paramount. The following attributes 
constitute the nature of God for Bowne: intelligence, personality, 
unity, unchangeability, omnipresence, eternity, omniscience, omni-
. 2 
potence, and immanence. It does not appear necessary for the pur-
poses of this thesis to consider in detail all the attributes; how-
ever, his concept of God's eternity will be noted because it does in-
dicate clearly the rationalistic strand. 
This attribute brings the discussion into the heart of Bowne's 
comception of time.3 B01me 's main concern in this attribute is to 
reconcile what he thinks should be the timelessness of God with the 
temporality of the world he founds. Here, the rationalistic element 
comes to the forefront: "We borrow from metaphysics the conviction 
that in any case, time is no form of existence but only of experience; 
and that it is essentially a relation in self-consciousness which 
varies with our finite conditions. "4 Again he says: 11 The knowledge 
l. THE., 149, emphasis added. 
2. See THE, 161-189. 
3. Footnote on time, 35. 
4. THE, 186, emphasis added. 
of the changing must be changeless, and the knowledge of time 
must be t:im.eless.n1 
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The will of God will be considered next, and a complete change 
in Bowne 1 s methodology will be easily noticed. The main concern 
will be to determine exactly what brought about this change in 
methodology. 
D. THE WILL OF GOD 
Needless to say, it is apparent that the above discussion did not 
reach the God of religion. It pointed to only a metaphysical princi-
ple that can account :for the world of understanding. This God is 
ethically barren, and, although, these metaphysical attributes :furnish 
the possibility of an ethical nature, they do not imply it. Therefore, 
the problem of God's ethical nature must be considered, and it must be 
determined if :faith in a moral God is based upon warranted :facts. 
In his arguments :for the theistic hypothesis and in his discussion 
of the metaphysical attributes of God, Bowne attempted to shaw that 
an appeal to a theistic hypothesis is necessary to arrive at a system-
atic interpretation of the :facts of science and the rational norms of 
the mind. Bowne argued: 1. To arrive at a satisfactory answer to the 
epistemological question, a universe transparent to our reason must 
be assumed;· and the only way to account :for the knowability of this 
universe is to posit a world-ground of the nature of intelligence that 
1. THE, 183. 
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founds and sustains the universe and has also created rational beings 
in its own image. 2. The so-called laws of science and the basic as-
sumption of science (the knowability of the universe) become meaning-
ful only in the light of a theistic hypothesis. Such scientific and 
philosophical concepts as force~ energy, causality, matter, motion~ 
time, space, and being only become meaningful when viewed in the light 
of intelligence. 3. The metaphysical attributes of God are the re-
sult of reflection upon the epistemological and metaphysical argu-
ments for God. Consequently, they too point to the most systematic 
interpretation of man1 s rational life. 
In the light oi: his arguments for the theistic hypothesis and the 
metaphysical attributes of God, j_ t would be reasonable to assmne that 
Bowne would allow the same approach in his di~cussion of the ethical 
attributes. However, he does not. The above approach can be called 
an emplri_cal approach, that is, Bowne attempts to give cognizance to 
all our beliefs based upon objective facts. Concerning the ethical 
attributes oi: God, Bowne does consider what he calls the empirical 
argument for the moral character of God, but dismisses it as not offer-
ing sufficient reason for faith in a moral source of the world. Now 
the basic task is to determine what element in these so-called empiri-
cal facts causes him to dismiss this approach,_ this same approach that 
he used almost exclusively in his arguments for the metaphysical attri-
butes of C-od. 
l. Empirical .Argument for God 1 s Moral Nature: 
The empirical argument for the moral nature 
of the world-ground is derived from our moral 
nature, the structure of society, and the course 
. 1 
of' history. 
a. Argument f'rom Man 1 s Moral Nature: Bowne points out that 
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man r s moral nature may be viewed in two ways: 11f'irst, as an ef'fect 
2 
to be explained; and secondly, in its immediate implications. tt In 
regard to the question of whether man 1 s moral nature points to a 
moral author, spontaneous thought has always regarded this to be the 
case, and for Bowne, speculative thought lmows of no better way to 
account f'or moral nature. He notes that just as there is no way of 
deducing intelligence from nonintelligence, so there is no way of de-
ducing the moral from the nonmoral. Saying moral and value judgments 
play such an important, if' not the most important, part in man 1 s life, 
God's morality cannot be denied without making him inferior to man. 
As already indicated, man 1 s moral nature can also be considered 
in its immediate implications. This view argues that conscience by 
its very nature poL~ts to a direct assertion of God. It must be noted 
that in discussing this argument, an almost complete change~in Bowne's 
methodology can be noted. In regard to it he says: 11 To one who as-
sumes nothing about the universe, one thing is not more surprising than 
another; and one thing is as allowable as another.n3 Gould not this 
srune basic question be raised concerning the rationality of' the uni-
verse? This point will be discussed further in considering Bowne 1 s 
objections to the empirical arguments. 
b. The Argument from the Structures of Life and Society and the 
l. THE, 250. 
2. THE, 251. 
3 • T".t:IE, 2 53.. 
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CoUl~se o£ History: First, in regard to the structure o£ life, this 
argument notes that life is such that it £urnishes a constant stimu-
lus in moral directions. This point o£ view argues tba t the virtues 
o:f li:fe always bring their rewards, while the wages o:f sin must be 
death. In regard to society, it is o£ such a nature that man must 
be virtuous i:f he hopes to live peaceably at all. He cannot escape 
the need o£ righteousness, truthfulness, honesty, and love i:f he is 
to live with his £ellow man in a society. .Second, this argument 
goes on to f13.Y that history teaches that righteousness always wins 
the day in this socio-historical process in which we live. 
2. Objections to the Empirical Arguments: Bowne is quick to 
note that these arguments are based upon a careful choosing o:f the 
:facts and ignores whole segments o£ li:fe, society, and history. 
He goes on to say: 
I:f any one had an interest in maintaining 
the opposite hypothesis o£ unwisdom and evil in 
the world-ground, much might be said :for it. 
The great mass o£ apparent insigni£icance and 
all the £acts o£ evil with which li:fe is crowded 
would lend themselves only too readily to illus-
trate such a view.l 
As _is apparent £rom this quotation, Bowne did not realize 
that he was using this double-methodological approach to the 
problems o:f philosophy. 2 
In ·dealing with strictly metaphysical and epistemological 
questions, Bowne had· little· to fJ3.y about the unwisdom o:f the 
world. In these cases, he went straight to a rationalistic 
1. THE, 257. 
2. THE, 58. It must be noted that numerous phrases and whole pass-
ages can be f'ound in Bowne that indicate that he was not con-
scious o£ this oscillation in his thought. Also see THE, l-38, 
257, 258, 2593 TTK, Vj SIT, l08-l45. 
conclusion, and insisted on the intelligibility of the world.1 It 
is only when he is cor1sidering moral and religious questions that he 
finds it necessary to consider the possibility that all is not neces-
sarily intelligible in the cogni ti'N:e realm. Bowne has complete con-
fidence in the empirical method when he is dealing with beliefs based 
on objective fact, but when he is dealing with beliefs based 'upon sub-
jective fact, this empirical approach is not considered satisfactory. 
Is it because these beliefs are based on so-called subjective facts? 
And therefore, they cannot be considered completely objective and 
free. These factors. may have influenced him; however, as already indi-
cated it would appear that Bowne unlmowingly changed his method-
ology because he found factors in the moral and religious realm that 
could not be made to coincide with the type of God that he bad a:r-
rived at through his epistemological and metaphysical arguments. Fac-
tors that the mind could not fit into a perfect rational whole, and 
yet, so common in life that they cannot be dismissed. Faced with 
these factors, he appealed to pragmatic principles without being fully 
conscious of the basic dichotomy he was bringing into his thought. He 
fo1md it necessary to call upon a will to believe in the face of con-
flicting facts. 
Thus Bowne obj.ects to the empirical argument for God because he 
sees that a choosing of facts in this realm gets nowhere. A good 
fact can always be found to balance the evil ones and vice versa. 
A continuation in this vein would in all probability end up 
1. See SIT~ 118-119; TTK, 35-36; above, 22-24. 
with a morally indifferent God. But this would not satis.fy man's 
moral nature, and man will not allow this moral nature to collapse. 
He will not be deterred by the evil .forces in the world. Man be-
lieves in the moral ideal, and, n.for the rest, life and the survival 
o.f the .fittest. decide. nl Man does not appeal to the trustworthiness 
o.f the mind or the intelligibility o.f the world. Instead he appeals 
. 2 
to the 1"ib.ole o.f his nature and not just his rationality. And still 
.further, the call is made .for moral action in the ethical struggle o£ 
humanity.3 Finally, in .facing the moral issue., Bowne points out that 
"the matter is commonly so complex as to elude definite and adequate 
~tatement.n4 
Bowne arrives at what would appear to be the core o.f the problem 
of evil when he notes that belief in the divine goodness nis greatly 
complicated by the problem of individuality. 115 He goes on to say that 
by taking a long-range view, perhaps a case can be presented for a 
moral factor in the world-order, but the .individual does not exist 
in a general way. Therefore, a general optimism does us little good 
in the case o.f evil befalling one individual person-particularly 
one not prepared for it. This problem brings the discussion to the 
essence of what Bowne has to say in a constructive way concerning 
the problem o.f evil. 
3. The Problem o.f Natural Evil: The .following quotation indi-
cates the whole tone o.f Bowne's treatment o.f the problem. 11 The only 
1. THE, 259. 
2. THE, 259-260. 
3. THE, 26G-26l. 
4. THE, 261. 
5. THE, 262. 
permissible question is not whether experience proves the goodness 
and righteousness of Go~ but whether it is compatible with faith 
therein."l He considers the problem of evil under the subject 
heading, 110ptimism and Pessimism, 11 whid]., of course, carries prag-
matic overtones. First, he distinguishes between what he calls 
the inductive and inferential approaches to the problem. He notes 
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that the discussion usually begins on this subject with the former 
and ends up with the latter. On the one hand, a start is made to 
show that life is good and then when it is faced with the dark and 
sinister aspects of life it falls back on an inferential long range 
view concerning the problem. An appeal is made to the hope "!?hat 
in the long run good will win out. Or the start is made from the 
pessimistic point of view; and when the many goods in life are 
noted, it is answered that in the long run there is more evil than 
good--all have to face death. 
Bowne goes on to point out that much of the discussion of the 
problem of evil has been vitiated by a theoretical and abstract 
treatment • The traditional antinomy concerning the problem is 
always brought forward, namely, the so-called conflict between 
the divine power and the divine benevolence. If pod is almighty 
in power, it is asked, then why is there evil in the world? For 
Bowne, far too often the theist has attempted to answer this piece 
l. THE, 263. It must be pointed out that this discussion is 
primarily based on Bowne 1 s Theism, in which his final views 
are formulated. Essentially, the same view may be found in 
his studies in Theism, 355-374; and his Essence of 
Religion, 45-69. 
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of closet logic by appealing to a theodicy following that of 
Leibniz, that is, the eternal truths of reason forbid the present 
world from being other than it is. He believes that in the case 
of moral evil this claim does have some applicability; moral evil 
can be considered as an implied possibility in a free finite sys-
tem. However, in regard to natural evil he says: nBut that the non-
existence of pain in its present degree, or even its utter absence, 
involves a contradiction or runs counter to some eternal truth 
1 is a proposition which is sadly in need of proof. 11 And still 
i'urther 
Whatever good purpose toothache and 
neuralgia and pestilence and i'ang and venom 
and parasites may serve, there is no proof 
that any eternal truth is to blame i'or their 
presen~e,or woul~;be damaged by their ab-
sence. . 
ConcOm:i tant with the above is the D:0.tion that ·this is the 
best possible world. For Bowne, this approach to the problem of 
evil is beset with confusion and misunderstanding concerning the 
nature of finite exi~tence. He ~oes on to say: no£' any i'ini te 
system whatever the questions woUld be. possible, why thus and not 
otherwise.n3 In other words, finite existence mp:st be accepted as 
such; and these views about how things could have been different 
get nowhere. 11 The only question that can be raised to edii'ication 
is whether the. actual system be compatible with creative goodness 










4. THE., 266. 
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his abstract pain and suf.fering. The discussion must stick to in-
dividual cases, nand ask .for living men to come forward and testi-
.fy .nl Each must decide from his first-hand experience -whether li.fe 
is .for good or evil. 
Another theoretical solution that Bowne dismisses concerning 
natural evil is that o.f evolutionary theodicy. This view generally 
argues that the universe is not yet complete, and is only in its 
raw beginning. Of course, basic to this view is the assumption 
that the outcome of this evolution will be for the good. Needless 
to say, there is no way of ascertaining this fact. .And still fur-
ther, if this evolutionary process is looked upon as impersonal, 
then there is nthe psychological fact that the evils -which we 
think spring from an impersonal order do not seem so exasperating 
as those which are due to purpose and are·a personal infliction.u2 
Needless to say, in the light o.f his metaphysical and epistemolo-
gical position, Bowne cannot accept this position. And, if the 
evolutionary system is looked upon as the result of the will of 
God, there is still the problem of ttjust why the world is less a 
crime when slowly produced than when created by .fiat does not at 
once appear, provided in both cases the .future is spanned by a 
bow of promise .u3 It is thus apparent that this evolutionary 
theodicy gets nowhere. 
l. THE., 267. 
2. THE., 270 
3. THE., 270 
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After dismissing all_ theoretical attempts to answer this ques~ 
tion, Bowne goes on to say: 11The question so far as we can deal with 
it· is one of experience rather than one of argum~nt. nl And, con-
cerning the goodness of God: nwe no longer seek to demonstrate but 
to illustrate. 112 And concerning the problem of illustrating God's 
goodness, he says, 11and it must be admitted that the world presents 
at ,first sight a grim and astounding spectacle.n3 And again: 
Passing over the strange features of 
the inorganic world, the apparent meaning-
lessness of so many of the lower orders of 
life, the fixed institutions of claws,fangs, 
and venom, and confining ourselves to the 
human world, we are filled with amazement 
and astonishment at what we find. Pain and 
death hold universal sway, and the cry ot the 
mourner goes up unceasingly unto heaven.4 
And still further: 
No ideas, no outlook, no progress, only 
animal wants and instincts, mostly unsatisfied 
-this sums up the history of the vast majority 
of h~an beings who have lived, or who live this 
day. 
One must admit that Bowne is not attempting to a void any of the 
evil aspect·s of this world~ 
After this frank admittance of a world permeated with so 
many evil factors, Bowne hastens to point out that many ills are 
the result of man r s ovm doings. Much physical pain is due to 
his failure to take care of himself. Needless to say, the social 
ills of the world can be traced to man's wrong doings. So many 














He also notes that it would appear to be a truism that 11 the high-
est manifestations of Character spring mainly from the soil of 
l 
sorrow. n Even death has helped to draw men closer together, and 
to understand each other. Therefore, in answer to Bowne's question 
of whether the world is compatible with the creation of gpodness, 
it can be said that considering the question from the point of view 
of everyday experience, it has to be admitted that many examples 
can be fo1md that show that evil and suffering can lead to a richer 
manifestation of man's highest qualities. The following quotation 
would appear to sum up Bowne's views concerning the goodness of God 
in the light of so many evil factors in the world. 
The net result of human experience is 
faith in the goodness of God. The problem 
is not abstract and academic, but concrete 
and historical. This faith, with all that 
it implies, will remain until human nature 
changes, or experience enters into a _contra-
dictory phase. The facts logically and 
abstractly considered, neither compel nor 
forbid this faith. They permit it, and to 
some extent illustrate it; and the mind 
with that faith in the perfect Which under-
lies all its operations refuses to stop 
short of the highest.2 
E. EVALUATION OF BOWNE 18 TREATMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 
In evaluating Bowne 1 s treatment of the problem of evil it 
.. 
. . 
must be determined Whether this inconsistency in his methodology 
invalidates his conclusions concerning the problem. (It would 
l. THE., 278. 
2. THE., 286. 
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appear that he has adequately met the second criterion by which the 
proposed solutions to the problem o:f evil are to be judged, that o:f 
adequately :facing the :facts o:f experience.) In other words: Does 
Bowne • s acceptance o:f a theoret:fu.cal impasse concerning the problem o:f 
evil invalidate his insistence upon a theoretical solution to the 
. . 
basic problems o:f metaphysics and epistemology? It would seem that 
i:f Bowne were to be completely consistent, he would have to admit that 
these other problems were not completely intelligible. However, as 
has already been noted, Bowne at no place seriously considers this 
P?Ssibility. At no place·does he suggest a will to believe or a sur-
vival o:f the :fittest belief' in regard to the metaphysical attributes 
o:f God. Here his rationality is in complete control. And when :faced 
,. 
with the problem of evil in regard to God's ethical nature, he appeals 
to pragmatic tenets. 
It would appear that there are at least three other ways within 
the personalistic :framework that Bowne could have approached this pro-
blem and avoided this dichotomy in his thought, and, consequent~, 
o:f:fered a more coherent solution to the problem. 
First, he could have insisted that .there are no evils in this 
world that are of such a magnitude that some good cannot ~e derived 
1 
:from the:p1, that is, there are no surd evils. By doing this, Bovme 
could have still insisted upon the intelligibility of the ethical na-
1. This is the view o:f L. Harold DeWolf', present Professor o:f Sys-
tematic Theology at Boston University Theology School. This view 
is· expressed in his outline used in his course in. systematic 
theology. 
48 
ture of God, and shown that a theoretical solution was possible con-
cerning the problem of evil. In this way, he would have been complete-
ly consistent with his approach to the preblems of metaphysics and 
epistemology. 
Second, he could have identified his doctrine of the determinative 
character of our moral. and religious feelings with the Kantian doctrine 
of the practical reason. Apparently, this is what he intended to do, 
but he failed because: l. Kant viewed the practical reason as autoni-
mousi and it was not determined by any interests or feelings. 2. For 
Kant, the validity of the principles of the practical reason lie in 
their a priori character which makes them universal and necessari.l 
The second writer to be considered in this thesis, Knudson, does come 
closer to the Kantian principle of the practical reason. 2 This idea 
of the religious apriority will be considered further in the discus-
sion of Knudson's treatment of the problem of evil. 
Finally, Bowne could have appealed to some farm of an irrational 
given to account for the problem of evil. Although Bowne was obviously 
perplexed and disfuurbed by the evil factors in life, he never even 
hinted at the possibility of certain factors in God's personality that 
might account for the presence of apparently surd factors in our ex-
perience. Of course, this view will be investigated thoroughly in the 
consideration of Brightman's position. 
l. See Ramsdell, PEE, l79 
2. Knudson told the writer in a private conversation that he thought 
Bowne was approaching the religious apriority, but never did ar-
rive at a full conception .of it. 
It would appear advisable to wait until the views of 
both Knudson and Brightman on the problem of evil have been 
considered before passing final judgment upon Bowne's treat-
ment. However, it would appear that in the light of his 
double-methodological approach, Bovme's consideration of the 
problem leaves so much to be desired. Certainly, this. can-
not be called a completely coherent approach. It will be 
interesting to see how the other two thinkers, to be inve:sti-
gated, working from the same personalistic framework, have 
attempted to deal with the problem. It stands to reason that 
if they had thought Bowne's solution adequate, they would 





KNUDSON' :S TREATMENT OF EVIL 
In many respects, Knudson i'ollows in the steps oi' Bowne in his 
consideration oi' the problem oi' evil. It would appear, however, 
that he does overcome the basic oscillation already noted in B0Wne1 s 
methodology. He accomplishes this by his insistence upon a reli-
gious a priori that, i'or him, gives man 1 s religious i'eelings and in-
terests a rational justii'ication comparable to that oi' the other 
basic interests of man, i'or example, the scientific. In i'act, the 
basic point which must always be kept in mind is whether Knudson 
i'ollows consistently this belief in the rational justification oi' re-
ligion when he is considering the problem of evil. With these 
thoughts ;i.h mind, this chapter will be concerned with the following 
topics. First oi' all, Knudson's conception oi' reason will be con-
sidered. Second, Knudson 1 s arguments i'or the existence and the na-
ture of God will be discussed. The main concern here will be with his 
argument i'rom the religious a priori. Third, Knudson 1 s ·views on the 
problem of _evil will be noted. And, finally, an evaluation oi' Knud-
son 1 s treatment of evil will be presented. 
A. KNUDSON 1:S CONCEPTION OF REASON 
Knudson dei'ines theology in the i'ollowing manner: 11 Theology may 
be defined as the systematic exposition and rational justii'ication of 
the intellectual content of religion. nl In the light of this defini-
l. Knudson, DOG, -l9. Hereafter, unless otherwise indicated, all quo-
tations in thiS Chapter will be f'rom Knudson IS WOrks. 
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tion, Knudson presents two basic arguments that he considers essen-
tial to Christianity. The first argument is that religious belief 
has an intellectual content; and secondly, that this content, to a 
bl f t . 1 . t. f. t. 1 certain extent, is C§!:pa e o ra J.ona JUS J. J.ca J.on. Consequent-
ly, the main concern here will be to determine at the outset exactly 
what Knudson means by the rational justification of religion; and in 
the process of doing this, it should become clear as to what he means; 
on the one hand by reason; and, on the other, by the intellectual con-
tent of religion. 
In an age beset by theological irrationalism, Knudson still 
remains faithful to the conception that religion can be rationally 
justified. He believes that this nreligious bankruptcy of the human 
mind11 has been supported by two mistaken conceptions of the nature and 
scope of reason. On the one hand, there is the restricting of reason 
to the field of purely deductive logical thinking, 11-where conclusions 
are deduced from premises and truth is demonstrated with mathematical 
2 
certainty. 11 Anselm's ontological argument for God is an example of 
this approach. Knudson points out that s<Jch an employment of reason 
has never been widely convincing and provides no adequate grounds for 
religious faith. On the other hand, there is the positivistic inter-
pretation of reason that limits it to the world of ph.enomena. For 
Knudson, this limitation of reason is unwarranted and is an arbitrary 
and dogmatic assumption with little support in the history of thought. 
1. DOG, 171. 
2. Bier, 42. 
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Under this view., reality remains an unfathomable mystery, and, for 
the irrationalistic theologian, only revelation can lift the veil. 
As over against these ~~o foregoing misconceptions of reason, 
Knudson postulates a view. of reason that is not sharply different-
iated from the other phases of our mental life. Reason pervades 
all our life and is both practical and theoretical. It is concerned 
with value experiences (including the religious), norms (both scien-
tific and moral), bare facts o:f experience, and does give us insight 
into the ultimate nature o:f reality. He goes_on to say: 
This comprehensive, practical, normative, 
and metaphysical conc~ption of the function o:f 
reason has become increasingly common in philo-
sophical and theological circles since the time 
of Kant, Hegel, and Schleiermacher.~ •• It is, then, 
proper to speak of a religious reason, a moral 
reason, and an aesthetic. ·reason as well as a 
theoretical reason.l · 
Common to all these reasons is a faith in a rational order that 
constitutes the basis of each of them. Consequently, faith and rea-
son are inextricably bound together and are complementary. 11 There 
. f . th . d . f . th n2 ls al lll reason, an reason lll al • 
It must be pointed out at once that these a priori capacities are 
not intended to departmentalize the human mind. They are merely :four 
fundamental ways in which the mind operates, and they presuppose 
a unitary self at the core of our experience. However, no one 
of these capacities can be reduced to or deduced from any of 
the others ·or any combination thereof. 11Each one is in a sense 
1. _ BICT, 43. 
2. BICT, 44. 
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ul t:Dna te and stands in its own right. n1 
Thus, the rational justi:fication and grounding o.f religion 
rests upon its own autonomous validity. Needless to say, this 
Dative capacity .for religion does not insure its adequate realiza-
tion. This can come about only by a process o.f self-criticism 
and personal development. However, there are external standards 
o.f religious truth, .for example, the church and the Bible. The 
religious a priori carries within itself its mm standard; the 
no1cm is found within the essence of the religious experience 
itself. This essence is discovered by personal reflection upon 
one's religious experience. It cannot be imposed by any external 
authority~ The human mind must be the final judge in helping man 
reach his decisions, but it is only through his personal experience 
of God that he discovers the essence of the religious a p~lori. 
B. KNUDSOliPE DOCTRINE OF GOD 
The main concern here will be with Knudson's arguments for the 
existence of God and what he considers to be the basic nature of 
God. As already noted in the introductory remarks to this chap-
ter, the main emphasis will be upon Knudson 1 s religious or a priori 
argument for the exis-tence of God. 
l. Problem of Existence of God: Knudson brings forward three 
arguments for the existence of God: the religious (a priori), the. 
moral, and the theoretical. Theywill be considered in the above 
order. 
l. BICT, 46. 
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a. The Religious Argument: As already noted in the evaluation o:f 
Bowne 1 s views on evil, it would appear that Knudson 1 s insistence on 
a religious a prio+i basic to the mental structure o:f t4e mind brings 
out the basic di:f:ference in their respective approaches to the theis-
tic hypothesis. Although, Bowne appeared to be moving towards a con-
ception o:f a religious a priori, he never did arrive at a concise 
conception o:f it. It may have been that he thought this approach 
had too strong a rationalistic ring, that is, the Leibnizian :form 
o:f rationalism. However, there is no need :for :further speculation 
concerning this question here. Knudson t s views on this subject 
represent an excellent attempt to show that the main reason :for 
man1 s belie:f in God can be traced to a religious a priori; and, 
in general, it wollld appear that he has developed :fully the latent 
insights o:f Bowne concerning this concept. 
Knudson observes that, in the main, three answers have been 
brought :forward to answer the question o:f the validity o:f the reli-
gious experience, namely, the immediacy o:f the religious experience, 
the value o:f the religious experience_, and the sell-verification o.:f 
the religious experience. He goes on to note that immediacy (the 
mystical position) and value (the pragmatic position) contribute 
much to the strong conviction o:f a religious belie:f, but both deal 
only with the psychological content o:f the belie:f. On the one 
hand, the immediacy ascribed to experiential knowle~ge is more 
apparent than real. There is no absolute or metaphysical immediacy 
in the knowing situation. Knudson goes on to say, 11all cognition 
. l 
is mediated, and hence is exposed to the possibility o:f error. 11 
Consequently, immediacy cannot be used to validate the religious 
experience. 
l. VRE, lLl-142 •. 
55 
On the other hand, the use of value as a criterion of truth has 
obvious shortcomings. In the first place, if a person does not have 
a religious experience, it can have no value for him. He can always 
explain away the other person 1 s religious experience by an appeal to 
some illusional theory of religion, for example, the PS<rchological (re-
ligion is the result of the misinterpretation of primitive emotions). 
Second, in many cases, this~ approach means an identification of value 
with utility, and, consequently, the identification of t~~hwith 
utility. Knudson quickly points out that any such identification 
means the destruction of truth itself. HTrutP, is one thing and 
utility is another.ul Unfortunately, there are ma:n:y beliefs that 
are utilitarian, but are in no sense of the word true. For Knud-
son, 11we must approach the subject from a profounder point of view.ll2 
Thus, for Knudson one does not begin with experience and then try 
to verify it, 11but with the question, How is experience possible? 11 3 
This question has already been partially ansvrered i..YJ. the earlier di~ 
cussion of Knudson 1 s conception of reason. However, it must be em-
phasized that, for Knudson, experience is not something passed from one 
mind to another. The mind is not a blank tablet that is passive before 
all experience. It is active and is the cause of experience, and its 
activity is expressed in the four distinct. categories already enumer-
ated, namely, sense, moral, aesthetic, and religious. Furthermore, a 
distinction must be made between the formal structure of experience 
and its material content. Despite this distinction, both are inextric-
1. vm::, !43. 
2. VRE, 145. 
3. VRE, 145. 
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ably bound together and are the result of mental activity. The so-
called material content is the result of God 1 s a~tivityj and the for-
mal content, of course, constitutes the basic activity of the mind. 
It is only through this interaction of.form and content that exper-
ience is possible. 
It is in the light of such a conception of the human mind and 
experience that Knudson believes the validity of the religious exper-
ience and the uniqueness of the religious nature must be conceived. 
He goes on to say: 
The religious argument is based on the 
uniqueness of man's religious nature. It 
is maintained, not that there is a separate 
religious faculty in the human mind.!) but that 
man has a capacity for religion as original 
and distinct as is his capacity for art, for 
morality, and for science) and that this cap-· 
acity When fully and consistently developed 
leads to the belief in God.l 
The main concern here will be with man 1 s religious a priori. 
Knudson points out that the choice of the term a priori to indicate 
the uniqueness of man's religious nature may not be a completely 
wise one. Needless to say, this arises from the extremely rational-
istic connotation of the term. However, he points out that he has 
chosen this concept for two fundamental and significant reasons. 
"The first is its original·and underivable character; the second, its 
2 
autonomous validity. n The first reason has already been emphasized 
in the discussion of Knudson r s views of the intellectual content and 
rational justification of religion; and in the above discussion of 
1. DOG, 218-219. 
2. VRE, 166. 
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Knudson 1 s conception o:f the nature of mind and the meaning of e.xper-
ience. Be:fore considering the second reasOll, however., it would ap-
pear advisable to note several other points that must be emphasized 
i:f the signi:ficance o:f the religious a priori is to be grasped. 1 
In the first place, it must be noted that the religious a priori 
does not necessarily legislate as to the psychological nature o:f the 
content of the religious experience., that is, it does not say whether 
th~ religious experience has to be o:f an emotional, mystical, moral., 
intellectual, or eclectic nature. Whatever the religious exp.erience 
may be :from the psychological standpoint, it reqUires an :i;mmanent. ·. 
mental pr:inciple to explain it. .Second, this religious a priori does 
not determine· whether the religious expBrience is ul t:ima.tely pre scrip-
tive or in£erential in nature. For Knudson, this question is not so 
significant as is commonly supposed. He argues that at the bottom 
there is no sharp distinction between these two concepts and tba.t in . 
reality they are complementary. No matter whether one arrives at his 
conception o:f.God through in:ference or what he considers direct per-
ceptual evidence, the religious a priori is still active. Third, this 
conception o:f the a priori structure o:f the mind does not look upon 
it as a ndistnterested logic machine.n The interests and tendencies 
o:f the mind reveal and express an original capacity o:f the mind, and 
belie:fs that satis:fy these interests can be accepted as true. Of 
course, this is the principle that underlies pragmatism, but· :for 
Knudson, pragmatism does not go :far enough. This type o:f a priorism 
1. VRE, 166-174. 
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accepts and utilizes pragmatic principles, but substantiates them with 
a more n substantial philosophical underpinning. 11 Fourth, the evidence 
~or the religious a priori is found primarily in the history of the 
race and not in any particular analysis o~ one individual mind. 
Knudson proceeds to note concerning the religious a priori at this 
point: 11 Here we have to do with a great racial fact-a :fact that is 
mani~estly grounded in human nature itsel:f .. n1 And ~inally, this a 
priori approach attempts to save religion ~rom the two extremes o~ 
thought that, for Knudson, constitutes a danger to it. On the one 
hand, there are the illusionistic theories that dismiss religion as 
an un~ortunate pathological development in man 1 s history. And on the 
other hand, there is Barthianism and its appeal to some absolute au-
thority that denies to reason the right to invade the sacred precincts 
o~ ~ai th. Knudson attempts to meet this double peril by his appeal to 
a priorism, which is an attempt to show that religion is woven into 
the very warp and woo~ of the human mind. Knudson goes on to say: 11 The 
religious apriorist maintains that religion is grounded as deeply and 
ineradicably in the human spirit as are science, morality and art.n2 
The most important aspect of the religious a priori ~or Knudson has 
still to be considered, namely, its autonomous validity. 0~ course, 
all the aforesaid enumerations concerning the religio~w a priori must 
. be kept in mind to comprehend exactly what Knudson means by autonomous 
validity or sel~-verification. He notes: 
The ultimate basis of this principle o~ 
self-verification is to be fo~Uld in the meta-
l. VRE, 171. 
2. VRE, 174. 
physical reality of the mind, in its creative 
activity, and in the fact that its activities 
result in certain fundamental and irreducible 
types of experience such as the sensuous or 
scientific, the ethical, the aesthetic, and 
the religious .1 
He argues that these distinct activities and interests of the 
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mind are not created or validated' by formal logic. They arise out 
of the activity of the individual and are self;....validating in the 
sense Tlthat they and their implications or postulates may be accep-
ted as valid, if they do not contradict the laws of reason." 2 · He 
quotes Bowne at this particular point: 1'Whatever the mind demands 
for the satisfaction of its subjective interests and tendencies may 
be accepted as real in default of positive disproof. 113 This is the 
law that the mind follows in the four basic realms of its activity. 
In all of these experiences, there is faith that through its activity 
the mind does reveal somethin.g about both the nature of reality and 
of itself. In the case of the sciences, there is faith in the intel-
ligibility of the world and in the ability of the mind to understand 
it. Man also has faith that his moral, aesthetic, and religious ex-
periendes also reveal something about the ultimate nature of reality. 
As in the case of the sciences, these faiths are only justified 
through first-person experience. 
Knudson does not mean to imply that these self-verifying a prioris 
are infallible. All of them are subject to criticism and revaluation 
in the light of new data. This is true of the theoretical, as well as 
l. VRE, l75. 
2. VRE, 175. 
3. Bowne, THE, 18. 
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the practical reason. This ver,v process of criticism indicates that 
there are norms of truth and that these norms are in the mind. It is 
not known exactly how these norms arise. HBut they are implicit in 
. 1 
reason itself, and we must recogruze them. 11 The logical must be dis-
tinguished from the psychological and the normative from the factual; 
only in this way can the truth be distinguished. Knudson admits that 
especially in the practical field (the aesthetic, moral, and religious 
norms), this is no easy task. All that can be done is to acquaint one-
self with the norms, live oneself into them, and wait for the response 
of the mind as to which of the norms are valid. Furthermore, these 
standards are not innate ideas, nor are they absolute in the sense 
that when once revealed they give a blueprint for all history. iE?..ather, 
they point to a goal for which the human mind strives. They show the 
direction and trend of the universe. In particular, the religious 
a priori reveals man 1 s most basic need and desire to understand the 
ultimate nature and destiny of the universe. 
Thus, for Knudson all of life is based upon a faith that the very 
activity of mind is the only source of any insight concerning the des-
·!Jiny of both man and the world. This is equally true of the four basic 
areas of his endeavor. In fact, he even claims that the religious a 
priori can claim a higher degree of certainty, as it is 11 a gift 
of God. 11 It is also apparent that Knudson in his conception of the 
religious a priori has made a valiant attempt to overcome the afore-
mentioned weaknesses of Bowne 1 s views on man 1 s religious nature. Of 
course, the faith expressed in these different areas is of a different 
nature. 
l. VRE, 179. 
But despite these differences between 
scientific and religious faith, it is faith 
in one case as truly as in the other, and 
there is no a priori reason w~y one should 
be accepted and the other rejected. Logic-
ally, the two are on the fame level. One 
is as valid as the other. 
b. The Moral Argument: Knudson first of all notes that, as it 
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is apparent, the moral argument is closely related to the religious 
argument. In fact, in his work The Philosophy of Personalism, he con-
siders them as aspects of one and the same argument, the valuational 
2 
argument. However, in his later works, he distinguishes between them. 
As already indicated, the religious argument emphasizes the :i.Jnm.ediacy 
of our religious experience. 
God is given to us in an act of faith or 
mystical intuition which resembles perception 
both in its objectivity and its certitude •••• 
The moral argument, on the other hand, stresses 
the spirit·ual necessity of the belief· in God.3 
As is true of the religious a priori, the moral a priori is autono-
mous. It reveals something about the basic structure of man and of the 
nature of external reality. Especially, all persons have a feeling of 
obligation or oughtness, that is, a good will or a moral nature. If 
this moral nature is not to be thrown back upon itself, then there must 
be an objective good for it to will. And, still further, this moral 
good points to a moral source akin to man 1 s OW11 moral nature. Thus, if 
the moral nature is not to be a reductio ad absurdum, there must be a 
moral author of both the objective good and the moral agent. There must 
be an ultimate end for wzn 1 s moral nature, an end he can worship and 
l. BICT, 47. 3. DOG, 228. 
2. POP, 306-314 
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love-God. It is only in the theistic world-view that man 1 s moral 
nature can find its rational basis. Of course, it is apparent that 
Knudson has followed the Kantian form of the moral argument. And 
the following quotation brings out the final summation of his views 
concerning this argument. 
It consists in pointing out the moral 
necessity of religion. The religious argu-
ment, on the other hand, dwells on the self-
evidencing power of religious faith. Both 
see in religion the product of an evalua-
tional process, and both imply c£nfidence 
in the validity of that precess. 
c. The Theoretical Argument: Knudson first of all notes that 
the so-called theoretical reason is, in its fundamental aim and ground, 
i practical. That is, it aims at the satisfaction of our sUbjective in-
terests; it is guided by ideals; for example, the ideal of intelligibi-
lity. Thus, it is possible to speak with Kant of the primacy of the 
practical reason. With these thoughts in mind, he considers the the-
oretical argument from two points of view, the epistemological and the 
causal. It must be added that Knudson rejects what he calls the con-
ceptual arguments,: that is, the ontological and other allied arguments 
based on Platonic realism. 
The epistemological argument takes two main forms. First of all, 
there is the dualism and the parallelism of thought~ that is, the dif-
ference between idea and object. For Knudson, there is no way to escape 
this dualism if one hopes to arrive at a tenable explanation of error. 
He believes that this parallelism can only be accounted for by a theistic 
monism. 
l. DOO, 233. 
2. DOG, 234-24l 
If an intelligent Being cast the world 
in the mold of thought and then created us 
in his image~ we can see how the thought-
series might correctly grasp the thing-series, 
but without this assumption, the parallelism 
of the two series must remain an insoluble 
riddle.l 
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The second argument necessarily follows from the first~ and it is 
concerned with man 1 s belief in the intelligibility of the world. The 
world must be cast in the mold of thought to be conceived by mind. 
Knudson again quotes Bowne at this point. 
The problem of knowledge implies thought 
at both ends--thought at the further end to 
make nature the bearer of meanings and thought 
at the nearer end to receive and rethink the 
ni.eaning.2 
Traditionally the causal arguments have taken two main forms, 
the cosmological and teleological. Knudson points out that modern 
thought has reinterpreted these arguments so that today the cosmo-
logical argument is concerned with the unity of the world-ground 
and the teleological argument attempts to establish its intelligence. 
The unity of the world-ground is apparent from its systematic inter-
action. For Knudson, this interaction .can only be accounted for by 
an appeal to a basal One that .is the cause of the LDteraction. It 
does no good to speak of the transfer of states and forces, as these 
are only figures of speech. Independent things in and of themselves 
cannot account for the interaction and interconnections that the de-
scriptive sciences reveal to us. Only a fundamental monism can ac-
count for this connectedness. 
l. DOG, 238. 
2. Bowne, Art.(l922) 369. 
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And still further, it is the height of inconsistency to attempt 
to account for this order by an appeal to an impersonal, blind en-
ergy. If this was the case, there would be no way to account for 
the fact that the world appears to follow certain laws. Thus, the 
intelligence of the underlying world-ground is pointed out by the 
fact that it is only by intelligence that one can account for the 
teleological aspects of nature. Also, the causal argument attempts 
to show that causality itself can be accounted for only by an ap-
peal to free intelligence. 
On the impersonal plane, the cause dis-
appears in the production of the effect, and 
metaphysical prediction becomes, consequently, 
impossible ••• Only on the personal plane do we 
have identity coupled with change and unity 
with plurality. Here the conscious and free 
agent constitutes itself coupled with change 
and unity with plurality .1 
2. The Nature of C-od: It does not appear necessary to consider 
in detail Knudson 1 s conception of the attributes of God except to note, 
on the one hand, his insistence upon the intelligibility of these at-
tributes for man, and, on the other, the intelligibility of the world 
for God. Knudson considers the nature of God from four vantage points: 
his absoluteness (omnipotence, omnipresence and eternity), his person-
ality, his goodness, and the traditional problems involved in the 
Trinity. In partic~llar does Knudson 1 s rejection of the traditional 




of God for man. In regard to the intelligibjJity of the world for 
God, he notes in discussing the absoluteness of God: nThis being 
is absolute in the sense that he is self-existent, that he has no 
limits except those which were self-imposed, and that the world is 
dependent upon him. 11 2 Also, for Knudson, one of the characteristics 
of God's personality is his omniscience: the future, past and pre-
sent constitute a kind of eternal now for God. liAll that we can say 
is tha. t God may have an intuitive grasp of the future tha. t transcends 
our human ways of knowing. 11 3 The importance of this vievr of the com-
plete intelligibility of the world for God has obvious implications 
in regard to the problem of evil. 
C. THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 
It would appear advisable to present in a surmnary form the basic 
tenets of Knudson's position enumerated thus far, before considering 
his view of evil. The main emphasis will be upon Knudson 1 s insis-
tence upon a rational and an intelligible inteJ~retation of the facts 
that influence man's present existence and determine his destiny in 
eternity. First of all, he has insisted that religion has an intel-
lectual content that is capable of rational justification. All he 
means by this contention is that reason permeates all of our en-
deavors, including the religious, and that religion has its own ration-
al autonomous validity that puts it on the same footing with the other 





254, emphasis added 
322. 
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the theoretical (scientific). 
Second, in his argument for God, Knudson has particularly in-
sisted upon the rational and theoretical element in man 1s thinking: 
l. His a priori argument is based upon the fact that man 1 s religious 
nature is woven . into the very warp and woof of his reasoning powers. 
2. His moral argument is also based upon the belief that it is only 
in a theistic world-view that man 1 s moral nature can find its ra-
tional basis. 3. Finally, both his epistemological and causal argu-
ments for God are based upon the fact that the ultimate nature of 
reality becomes meaningful only when we assume that at its core it is 
a rational basal monism. 
Finally, in presenting his views on the nature of God, Knudson's 
emphasis upon rationality and intelligibility is very apparent: 1. In 
discussing his absoluteness, he emphasizes that there are no 11 frus-
trating givens 11 in God 1 s nature. 2. God 1 s personality is of a ra-
tional and intelligible nature~ 3. Lastly, he rejects the traditional 
conception of the Trinity because it is not completely intelligible. 
It is very apparent from the aboYe that in his arguments thus far, 
Knudson has always insisted upon the intelligibility of the ·factors 
pertaining to both God and the nature of man. It will be interesting 
to see if he continues in this same vein in his discussion of evil. 
His approach to the problem of evil will be considered from three van-
tage points·. First of all, Knudson rs objections to the traditional 
views of evil will be presented. Second, his own Views in regard to 
it will be noted. And finally, the bearing of sin upon the problem 
of evil will be considered. 
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l. Knudson's Objections to the Traditional Theodicies: Be-
fore considering Knudson•s view of evil~ it would appear advisable 
to consider his objections to the more traditional views concerning 
the problem of evil. Consequently~ his objections to the biblical~ 
the Augustinian, the Leibnizian and dualistic solutions to the pro= 
blem of man t s suffering will be presented. The main emphasis will 
be upon his theoretical or rationalistic reasons for rejecting these 
proposed solutions. 
a. Biblical Teaching: First of all, Knudson observes concern-
ing the biblical teaching about evil: 11 In Scripture, there are two 
different views of natural or physical evil--one retributive~ and 
l 
the other pedagogical, or disciplinary. n The first view refers to 
the teaching of the Old Testament and the second to that of the New 
Testament. On the whole, in the Old Testament, God is thought of as 
a king or judge; and man 1s suffering is the result of the breaking o:f 
divine creeds. I<"nudson admits to a large element of truth in this con-
ception that pain and misfortune are punishments for sin and that 
health and prosperity are the rewards of righteousness. However, he 
goes on to point out three defects in this conception of suffering: 
l. There are many instances of suffering "When it is apparent that it 
is not punishment for sin. 2.. It is too utilitarian in its concep-
tion that rewards and punishments are legitimate and determinate fac-
tors in moral conduct. 3. This view could be interpreted to imply 
that the poor ~nd the sick are suffering from God's wrath, which of 
course is a mere figment of the imagination. 2 
l. DOR, 169-170. 
2. BICT, 75. 
Th~ primary emphasis of the New Testament teaching is that 
n suffering is primarily disciplinary or pedagogical in character. n 
This change of emphasis results primarily from two basic causes. 
On the one hand~ there is the changed conception of God that takes 
its clue from the family rather than the law court. And, on the 
other hand, there is the eschatological view of the New Testament 
in which the temporal ills of life lose their old finality and 
come to be regarded as disciplinary, as means to an ultimate good~ 
as factors in the spiritual education of mankind. 1\nudson observes 
that these practical solutions of the problem of evil did not meet 
the needs of later Christian thought, and it is to the more ingenious 
of these solutions that he next turns.1 
b. The Augustinian Theory: It was Augustine r s conviction 
that neither natural evil nor moral evil could be attributed to God. 2 
Both~ for him~ were the result of the human will. For sin~ man is 
directly responsible, and natural evil or suffering is a consequence 
<. 
of sin, and thus, man is directly responsible for it. Of course~ 
Augustine was cognizant of the fact, that much suffering~ a~ far as 
man can tell, is not traceable to sin. Consequently~ as a disciple 
of Plato and Paul, he·devised the ingenious idea of identifying the 
human race with Adam. Thus, when Adam .fell, the human race fell. 
Knudson notes two basic weaknesses in this Augustinian approach 
to the problem of evil. On the one hand~ there is the logical fiction 
of identifying Adam with the human race; ULJiversal ideas have no 
existence per se. On the other hand~ the other basic pillar of this 
l. BICT, 93-108; also see DR 169-175. 
2. DOR~ 17)-186; also see, BICT~ 98-99. 
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theory~ its acceptance of the biblical account of the fall, is 
not in keeping with the tenor of modern thought and cannot be 
accepted as a historically accurate account of the origin of death 
and the other evils of the world. Thus, for Knudson, the Augustinian 
view cannot be accepted~ 11 It was based on a logical fiction and a 
myth."l Such fallacious ideas as that of a ra.ce man and a race sin 
ca~Dot be accepted in the light of modern logic and anthropologg. 
c. The Leibnizian Theory: For Knudson, the next post-biblical 
theo:ry of suffering that is worthy of note is that of Leibniz. As one 
would expect, Leibniz's theory is based upon his rationalistic neces-
2 
sitarianism. Conseque~tly, the only explanation of evil is to say 
that it is a rational necessity that stems from the creation of a fin-
ite world by God. If the created monads were as perfect as God, there 
would be no way of distinguishing them from God. What gives them their 
individuality and their distinction is their imperfection. However, 
this is still the best of all compossible worlds that God could possible 
create as the result of his rational nature. Thus all the pain and sin 
in the v~rld stems from the metaphysical imperfection that rests ulti-
mately upon God's own rational nature. 
Knudson proceeds to note three basic weaknesses in this view of 
evil that makes it untenable for any Christian theologian. First of 
all~ the metaphysical imperfection that is the basic cornerstone of 
this theory is not an evil in the same sense that paiJl and sin are. 
1. DOR, 18.5. 
·2. DOR, 186-196; BICT, 99-102 
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Second, m1der no circumstances can the evils o£ ~£e be deduced 
£rom the 11 eternal truthsn o£ reason and be regarded as rational 
necessities. 11There is no law o£ reason that requires the ex-
istence o£ cancer, epilepsy., toothache, paralysis or any o£ the 
other countless forms of human ills.u1 Finally, the Leibnizian 
solution disregards nthe distinctive element in personality that 
alone makes the problem significant. rr Knudson is here referring 
to the freedom of man, the £act that he is an end in himself. For 
Leibniz, man is merely part of the great ncosmic machine.n The 
' free personal relationship between man and Go:i which is basic to 
the Christian approach to evil is wanting in Leibniz; and, conse-
quent~y, this solution cannot be accepted. 
d. Theories of Divine Finitude: Knudson notes that in gen-
eral these theories have followed one o£ two principles. Either 
there is some evil principle in the world that- limits the activity 
of God, or God is somehow limited by his own nature so that he can-
not prevent or banish the evil of li£e. It would appear that Knudson 
is correct in his contention that the first principle has never been 
seriously considered by Christian theologians and cannot be accepted 
as a satis£actory solution to the problem o£ evil. 11It is hardly 
more. than a baptized naturalism, in which God appears as a £eeble ap-
pendix to the real world.n 2 
However, lfuudson does psake an extensive criticism o£ the second 
o£ these principles. But, saying the philosopher 1s views that he uses 
as an example o£ this approach are to be-considered in the sequel, his 
l. DOR, 193. 
2. DOR, 203. 
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criticism will be enumerated at that time. Sui'fice to say, in these 
criticisms he makes extensive use of theoretical and rational prin-
ciples_, principles that he· does not feel necessitated to use in his 
own views on evil. 
2. Knudsen's Argtiments Concerning Evil: Knudson's views on 
evil can be briefly summarized and will be considered from four van-
tage points. First of all, before considering his specific arguments, 
it would appear advisable to enumerate Kant 1 s views on evil, saying 
Knudson rs position is closely aligned to that of Kant. These ccnsi-
derations will be followed by the second vantage point, which is al-
ready apparent from the above discussion, Knudson's rejection of all 
theoretical solutions to the problem of evil. Third, some basic con-
siderations that Knudson believes to throw some light on the problem 
of suffering will be presented. Finally, his own practical solution 
will be summarized. 
a. Knudson's indebtedness to Kant: Besides rejecting the tra-
dional theoretical arguments for God, Kant also rejected the tradi-
tional theoretical attempts-to harmonize the abstract attributes of 
God with the actual evils of the world. Thus, Kant instituted 11 a 
change of venue from the theoretical to the practical reason. u For 
Kant, the evils of the world are to be interpre-J::ed in the light of our 
moral consciousness, and the problem of how they entered the world be-
comes of secondary importance. Also, basic to this position is the 
contention that human righteousness, not happingss, is the ultimate 
aim of life. The evils of life 11 can have meaning and value only in 
so far as they contribute to the development of moral character or 
1 
offer an opportunity for such development." 
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Of course, there is alwa;~rs the question of whether the pessimist 
or the optimist represents the normative type of reaction to the 
evils of life. For Kant, and also for Knudson, -when the evils of 
life are viewed within the Christian framework, they do offer an 
opporturLity for the moral development of mankind. Knudson goes on 
to say concerning the optimists! 
In so far as they are true to their own 
basic principles, they see in the world With 
all its dark and forbidding aspectsJ a train-
ing school of mankind.2 
Of ccnrse:; this is a practical solution, not a theoretical oneJ ttbut 
it is the only real solution of the problem possible to us under the 
present limitations of human knowledge.n3 
b. Knudson 1 s Rejection of All Theoretical Solutions: HFollow-
ing Kant, the tendency is to regard the problem of natural evil as 
theoretically insoluble. 114 For Knudson, all the theoretical solutions 
that have come forth have had obvious faults and limitations, the 
most important ones having been enumerated above. Concerning all ef-
forts that attempt to account for evil by necessity, whether this 
necessity be of a rationalJ non-rational, or anthropological nature, 
Knudson observes: 
The bare necessity of evil, no matter how 
or where it may be grounded, throws no light 
on the actual evils that confront us. They 
remain as dark as ever~ No necessity, ratignal 
or irrational, can explatn their necessity.~ 
. 1. BICT, 105. 4. DOR, 213 • 
2. BICT, 106. 5. DOR, 215. 
3. Bier, 106 
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c. Some Basic Considerations Concerning Man's Suffering: 
Having rejected all theoretical attempts to solve the problem of evil, 
Knudson goes on to point out some f~ctors that he believes do throw 
some light on the problem. In the first place, far too many people 
evaluate the evils of life from a hedonistic standpoint. 11 They look 
upon the passive pleasures of life as its chief goods, and hence con-
. l 
demn the universe for causing or allowing so much pain and suffering. 11 
Of course, for Knudson this is the wrong orientation. The 11true goal 
of life is ethical; it lies in achievement, in the formation of charac-
ter, and from this point of view much of human suffering is seem. in a 
new light. rr 2 
·Second, another source of confusion concerning evil is the 11 exclu-
sive anthropocentricism 11 into which people fall. For Knudson, it is 
manifestly too narrow a point of view to look upon the world as made 
solely for human ends. 11The world may well have other than human ends 
and any fair estimate of its 'dysteleological 1 aspects must take this 
into account.u3 Also, the cosmic order must be maintained, and there 
is the possibility that certain evils can occur that are a necessary 
accompaniment or by-product of this maintenance, that are not neces-
sarily integral to it:, and, consequently,; not a divine end in the 
strict sense of the term. Of course, any such evils are ultimately 
due to the divine will; but they need not be regarded as an immediate 
and complete expression of this will. 
l. DOR., 2l5. 
2. DOR, 216. 
3. DOR, 216. 
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Still another basic point is~tbirdly~ the undue antbropo-
morphism of modern thought. This anthropomorphism is expressed in 
man's failure to distinguish between cosmic and human ethics. Man 
cannot apply his human standards of right and wrong to the creator. 
Also, man errs in assuming that the lower animals suffer in the same 
manner and situations that he does. Man has no way of knowing the 
nature and extent of their sufferings and is hardly warranted in 
pronouncing them wholly out of harmony with divine love. 
One final point is the fact that man has not fully understood 
the meaning of' pain. For example, ttit is often a warning of im-
pending danger and so serves an important function in the preserva-
tion of life.tt1 It is also a foil of pleasure and intensifies enjoy-
ment by way of contrast. However, its chief' significance lies in 
its contribution to the moral and spiritual life. It is doubtful that 
man could rise above the sense plane and enter a truly spiritual life 
if it were not for pain and suffering. "Natural evil would thus seem 
an indispensable means of our attaining to the life of the spirit. 112 
Thus, life 1 s evils lose much of their harshness and unintelligibility 
when viewed from a Christian philosophy of life. 
However, Knudson goes on to observe: HThere are dark phases of 
human history and vicissitudes in the lives of individuals that leave· 
us baffled. 11 3 For him., this is not surprising in the light of the 
complexity of the world and man • s limited knowledge. But, to look 
l. OOR, 218. 
2. DOR, 219. 
3. OOR, 219. 
upon these amazing phenomena as either an expression of divine 
goodness or wrath 11 is not the part of wisdom •••• The wise and more 
scientific method is franl<ly to confess our ignorance and retain 
our faith.nl 
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3. Knudson 1 s Practical Solution to the Problem of Evil: Knudson 
first of all notes that from the practical point of view: 11Religion 
is more concerned with victory over evil than with an explanation 
2 
of it. 11 Each one of us must decide from his own personal experi-
ence whether he has won the victory, 11 and whether he has done so 
or not must be to a large extent a matter of his own convictions." 
Knudson next observes that victory is possible as attested by the 
fact that unncunbered thousands through the ages have fought and 
won the battle of evil. 11 They may not know why they and others 
have suffered as they have, but they have f'ound God in the world, 
and hence_, they are assured that it is his world. u3 
Once they have overcome the evils, nthey can see a divine 
hand in them all. 11 For Knudson_, the problem of evil receives its 
religious solution in this attitude of the soul that evil is an 
enemy to be overcome. 
We are redeemed, not only from suffering, 
but in and through suffering; and suffering in 
turn takes on an altogether new meaning through 
the experience of redemption. It ceases to be 
a dark, repugnant, and inexplicable fact and be-
comes a divine agent in the training and eman-
cipation of the human spirit.4 
4. The Relation of Bin to Natural Evil: For Knudson, sin is the 
l. DOR, 219. 
2. DOR, 220. 
J. DOR, 221. 
4. DOR, 221. 
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great evil of life. It is the root evil of life, and other evils 
follow in its train. It is the super-evil, the evil of alienation 
from God. True, .complete sal vat ion mu9.t include redemption from the 
natural evils of the world. 
But that is secondary, a later stage of 
the redemptive process. Irmnediately and di-
rectly Christianity is concerned with moral 
evil. Indeed, sin may be1 said to be its most fundamental problem. 
However, Knudson rejects the older Christian doctrines of the 
fall of man, of original sin, and of human depravity. 
We have defined it Lsiri/as a defective 
attitude towards God, towards other people, and 
to·ward our true selves, for which we are account-
able in God1 s sight. Its ultimate origin we 
have found in the enormous difficulties that 
stand in the way of man r s perfect fulfillment 
of the moral law.2 
Sin cannot be considered as part of the divine plan in the same 
sense that evil is. If The only responsibility that God has for sin is 
in allowing for its possibility. 11 3 Needless to say, the possibility of 
sin results from man 1 s freedom. Knudson does admit that God probably 
foresaw the present sinful state of man, but he must also believe that 
there is within man a deeper capacity of love that will eventually 
overcome his sinful ways. 
The important point concerning sin in regard to natural evil is 
that, although much of what we call evil is the result of man 1 s sinful 
ways, there are still evil forces in the world that cannot be traced 
l. DOR, 222-223. 
2. DOR, 266. 
3. DOR, 269. 
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to man 1 s sinning. God is responsible for this evil~ and it does 
constitute part of his divine plan .for man. 
D. EVALUATION OF KNUDSON'S TREATMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF·EVJL 
Here~ again, as it was found to be in the case of Bowne 1 s treat-
ment of the problem of evil, it would appear that there is a basic 
oscillation in Knudson•s thought brought about by the problem of 
evil. On the one hand~ there is his insistence, that, on the whole, 
the problems concerned with the existence and nature of God are amen-
able to the rational and theoretical nature of man. Yet, on the other 
hand, there is his complete theoretical agnosticism when faced with 
the problem of e~ TIThe renunciation of a theoretical solution of 
the problem of evil, however, does not preclude a practical solution 
to it. nl Consequently, it would appear that the following question 
must be answered: Is Knudson's theoretical agnosticism before the 
problem of evil completely consistent with his detailed theoretical 
approach to the other problem of theology? 
This question will be considered from three vantage points. First 
of all, an attempt will be made to show that Knudson does violate the 
basic premises of l1is theological pos~tion by his acceptance of a 
theoretical impasse before the problem of evil. Second, as the above 
quotation brings out, Knudson apparently calls for a complete break 
between man 1 s theoretical and practical reason, a dichotomy completely 
inconsistent with his contention that they are inextricably bound 
together in man 1 s rational nature. 2 . It would appear that this in-
consistency can be traced to Kant 1 s influence, and the question of 
whether Knudson can consistently appeal.to Kant's position at this 
point will be explored thoroughly. 3 Finally, it will be pointed out 
l. DOR, 220. 
2. See above, 50-53. Also see, BICT, 43-44. 
3. See above~ 7l-72. Also see, BICT, l04-l07. 
that Knudson could have resolved this apparent dichotomy in his 
thought by a more theoretical approach to the problem of evil. 
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It is very apparent from the above discussion that Knudson, up 
until his consideration o£ the problem of evil, has insisted that, 
on the whole, the problems o£ theology can be solved in a theoreti-
cal intelligible manner. His latest work, Basic Issues in Christi~D 
Thought, was written upon this basic assumption. His whole argument 
£or the religious a priori, in many respects his most original con-
tribution to theology, is based upon the contention that reason is 
woven into the very warp and woo£ of both man and the universe. He 
even re£ers to one o£ his arguments £or God as the theoretical argu-
ment. His whole discussion of the nature o£ God is permeated with 
theoretical and intellectual contentions and assumptions. His dis-
missal o£ the more traditional view on evil is in most cases based 
upon their theoretical and rationalistic weaknesses and inconsisten-
cies. Yet, in his own treatment o£ evil he would appear to do a com-
plete about £ace in regard to his methodological procedure. Here, no 
theoretical solution, not ~ ~ the whole, is possible. He calls 
upon his readers to accept a theoretical agnosticism, an agnosticism 
completely inconsistent with his view o£ man 1 s reason. Consequently, 
it would appear that Knudsonrs inconsistency at this point does weak-
en his belie£ that his solution is the most probable hypothesis in 
regard to evil. It is too much to call upon one to follow and com-
prehend the involved reasoning in the personalistic theological, 
metaphysical, and epistemological positions, and then suddenlywhen 
.faced with the problem of evil demand that he discard one of tbe 
basic tenets of his rational nature. 
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Second, as already indicated above, Knudson has been greatly in-
fluenced by Kant in his theological position, and particularly paid 
him a debt of gratitude in regard to the problem of evil. However, 
it· is very apparent that be does not accept Kant 1 s views concerning 
the nature of reality. Briefly, Kant bifurcated reality by his in-
sistence upon a mechanistic interpretation of the phenomenal realm 
on the one hand, and his equally insistent demand for the freedom of 
the noumenal self on the other hand. This noumenal self, of course, 
being primarily concerned with man 1 s moral nature. However, Knudson 
insists that the moral, religious, aesthetic, and scientific a priori 
structure of man's nature is one metaphysical whole. There are no 
sharp distinctions between any of the aspects of man's nature, and all 
are permeated with the common reason of mankind. 
Kant's views on evil are based upon this bifurcation of reality. 
Its theoretical agnosticism is in complete harmony with his conception 
of the limitations of man's reasoning powers and his insistance upon 
the moral character of the noumenal self. Consequently, man is in no 
position to theorize about the natural evils o.f life, particularly when 
they originate in the phenomenal realm. He can only consider them .from 
the point of view of his moral nature, and when viewed in this light, it 
would appear that in many cases they do help in his moral development. 
Saying that Knudson rejects Kant's view of reality and man, it 
would appear that his approach to evil is untenable :for Knudson in 
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the light o:f his own theological position. Knudson has given a 
:free reign to man's reasoning powers, and has made ample use o:f 
them in this theological argument. Yet, when faced with the 
problem of evil he does not call for the full use o:f all of man 1 s 
reasoning powers. As emphasized above, this w:::; uld appear to be 
completely inconsistent with the basic contention o:f his last five 
published works that ureligion has an intellectual content that is 
capable of rational justification. 11 
Finally, it would appear that Knudson could bring his views 
on evil into closer harmony with his other theological views and 
his conception of reason, if he would insist that it is theo-
retically possible that all natural evil can and does serve some 
good. In this manner man 1 s theoretical and practical reasons 
would still be bound together in his rational nature. At no 
place in his published works does Knudson hold for this conf' 
tention. Although he insists that Brightman's conception o.:f 
surd evil is 11inconsistent with the spirit both of true science 
and of true r~ligion," 2 the only alternative approach he offers 
is that man should ascribe the apparent irrationality o.:f these 
l. As already pointed out in an earlier footnote, this is the view 
of L. Harold DeWolf, present professor o.:f systematic theology 
at Boston University Theological School. However, in a 
private conversation, Knudson told the writer that he could not 
accept this point o.:f view, giving the limitations o.:f ma.n 1 s 
intelligence as the reason for his stand on this particular 
issue. 
2. DOR, 208. 
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evils to his ovm ignorance. It can only be observed that this 
w:illingness of' Knudson to ascribe to man's ignorance) his f'ailure 
to comprehend f'ully the natural evils of' lii'e, does appear to 
undermine Knudson's theoretical arguments f'or the goods of' life. 
If the evils of life are disposed of by an appeal to human ig-
norance, then by the same logic, the goods of' life have also 
. 1 been d1sposed of. 
Thus, it can be observed tbat Knudson has partially undermined 
his own theological position by his acceptance of' a theoretical 
impasse before the problem of' evii~ Although he made a noble and 
praiseworthy attempt to secure a :tational foundation for man's 
religious interests by his religious a priori, he partially dis-
regards this methodological approach in his approach to evil. 
Consequently, it would appear that the two men considered thus 
f'ar have not been completely consistent in their methodological 
approaches to the problem of' theology. In both cases, it has ap-
parently been the problem of' evil that has caused the~ to discard 
their avowed allegiance to a completely rational and reasonable 
approach to the problems of' life. It 1·emains to be seen whether 
the :final thinker to be considered) E. S. Brightman, overcomes 
this apparent basic dichotomy in the thought of both Bowne and 
Knudson. 
1. Cf., Brightman, PORJ 269. 
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CHAPTER IV 
BRIGH'IMAN 1 S EMPIRICAL TREATMENT OF EVIL 
In the discussion of both Bowne and Knudson, it was apparent 
that there was a basic inconsistency in their theological posi-
tion, an inconsistency resulting primarily from their analysis 
of the problem of evil. On the one hand, in Bowne, there was a 
basic oscillation between pragmatic and rationalistic elements 
in his methodology that he never resolved. Also, it was apparent 
that this appeal to at least an attenuated .form of pragmatism-
a will to believe---was called upon. in regard to man' s religious 
beliefs because of the problem of'evil. Knudson, on the other 
hand, although he attempted to anchor man 1 s spiritual nature by 
his religious a priori, still had certain methodological dif.fi-
culties. Basically, although he had argued that man 1 s theoreti-
cal and practical reasons were inextricably bound together in 
man1 s rational nature (and had treated them as a unity in his 
arguments for both the existence and nature of God), he still 
insisted that the problem of evil, on the whole, was not amenable 
to man 1 s theoretical nature. Thus, he was not completely con-
sistent to his conception of man 1.s rational nature. 
Brightman, in regard to these solutions, observes that they 
rest upon (1) ''a confusion of good and evil11 and (2) 11 the irrele-
.. - ~ 1 
vance of ignorance. 11 By (1) the confusion of good and evil,Brightman 
1. Brightman, POR, 269. Hereafter, unless otherwise indicated 
all quotations in this chapter will be from Brightman 1 s works. 
merely means ti:at if' man cannot rationally determine -whether 
there is evil in the world, neither can he rationally determine 
if' there is good. 11If' lmowledge of' the Whole is necessary to 
a knowledge of the parts in the case of the one-the natural 
evil--Why not in the case of the other, the moral?111 In regard 
to (2), the irrelevance of' ignorance, he is arguing that 11 our 
ignorance cannot be used to support any belief' • 11 Ignorance is 
no reason for taking apparent evil to be real· or incomplete good. 
IIFrom our ignorance alone nothing whatsoever follows about the 
. 2 
unlmown, except the tautology that we do not know. 11 Brightman 
does observe that the arguments of Bowne and Knudson have an ad 
hominem f'orce for him, since he once held to them himself. nNever-
theless, the objections to it now seems decisive.n3 
Although it cannot be stated categorically that the problem 
of natural evil has been the pivotal point in Brightman's think-
ing, he does in an article entitled 11From Rationalism to Empiri-
cism, n give his view of a finite God and the problem of' evil en-
tailed therein as one of the basic reasons for his change from 
rationalism to empiricism.4 Also, it is very apparent from al-
most all of his works that the problem of evil has played a 
dominant role in the shaping of his thought. Although it is 
l. POR, 270. 
2. POR, 270. 
3. FOR, 269, footnote. 
4. Art. (1939), 278. 
83 
84 
beyond the scope of this thesis to trace the development of his 
thought, the main concern being with his mature thought and its 
relation to the problem of evil, it does appear advisable to in-
dicate the stepping stones in the development of his thought in 
regard to the problem of evil. 
As noted in the above objections of Brightman to the positions 
of Bowne and Knudson in regard to evil, Brightman in his earlier 
writings advocated essentially the same view towards evil. In 
the first edition of his work, An Introduction to Philosophy (1925), 
he notes: 11The problem of evil admits of no final, no completely 
enlightening solution •••• Our partial knowledge of purpose implies 
larger purposes of which we are ignorant. 111 His A Philosophy of 
Ideals (1928), appears to have been written in a transitional 
period during which he was beginning to view the problem from his 
present perspective. He notes here in discussing nature and evil 
that the struggle in ourselves between nature and ideals is akin 
to and the consequence of na~ struggle within the divine nature. 112 
The publication of The Problem of God (1930), with its intro-
duction of the conception of The Given, brought into the open his 
~ 
break with the traditional theistic personalistic approach to the 
problem. Needless to say, this work brought forth a volley of 
l. ITP, 295-297. 
2. POI, 99. 
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criticism. In answering this criticism, Brightman enlarged and 
developed his conception of The Given beyond the so-called passive 
elements to which he had limited it in this work. The Given is 
enlarged to include both the passive elements 11 and also the eternal 
divine reason, with its principles of truth, beauty, and good..11ess.n1 
This v:i,ew of The Given would appear to be essentially the same as 
that presented in his A Philosophy of Religion (1940~ This mature 
conception of The Given will be given detailed consideration when 
Brightman's conception of God is considered. 
It would appear that the best method of approaching Brightman's 
empirical treatment of the problem is in the following manner. First, 
the basic tenets of his 11radical empiricismn will be enumerated. 
Here, the main emphasis will be upon his conception of experience, 
his epistemology, and his methodology. By its very nature, this 
discussion will lead, secondly, to his conception of the person. 
The main emphasis here will be upon the nature of human personality 
and purpose. This discussion of human purpose will necessarily 
lead, thirdly, to Brightman's axiological position. These con-
siderations of value will bring to the forefront the status of 
religious values~and, consequently, also the problem of disvalue. 
The problem of disvalue will carry the chapter_, fourthly, to the 
problem of the thesis.:; that of evil. Fifth, this discussion of 
1.. Art. (1932), 134. 
~) 
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evil will lead the discussion to his conception of the kind of 
God that can be empirically postulated in the light of the evils 
in life. And, finally, this conception of theistic finitismwill 
be evaluated. 
A. BRIGHTMAN 1S RADICAL EMPIRICISM 
In general, Brightman's philosophical position can be looked 
upon as a modification of Bowne 1s position but with 11 a greater 
attention to empirical fact.n As indicated by the article noted 
above, 11From Rationalism to Empiricism," the problem of what con-
stitutes empiricism has been paramount in his thought for the past 
two decades. He notes: Tt.A radical change has dominated the decade 
for me, namely, a change from emphasis on the rationalistic and a 
priori factors in religious knowledge to emphasis on the empirical. nl 
The following points will be emphasized in this discussion of Bright-
man's empiricism: his conception of experi~nce, his epistemic posi-
tion, and his methodology. 
1. Brightman rs Conception of Experience: The main concern 
·here will be to determine exactly what Brightman means by an appeal 
to experience. The very first sentence of his .A Phil~sophy of Re-
ligion points to the essence of his conception of experience. 11 0ur 
experience consists of our entire conscious life. 112 At another point, 
1. Art. (1937), 276. 
2. POR, 1. 
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he notes.: 11Whatever is present in consciousness is said to be exper-
. l 
J..enced." And, still further, 11 Experience is given only as a conscious 
state of affairs. 2 To experience is tobe aware.n This all-inclusive 
view of experience includes 11what has been called transcendentaln and 
11what has been called empirical. 11 It must be emphasized that all else 
outside the momenta~J experience of consciousness is to be inferred. 
To use Brightman 1 s own terminology, the Situation Experienced (the 
momentary experience) must be distinguished from the Situation Be-
lieved in (that to which it refers). Of course, Brightman must ad-
mit that 11it is true that, for any present experiar:tt, its own past is 
no longer a Situation Experienced. 113 
He believes, however, that the apparent precariousness of the ex-
perient is overcome by a coherent interpretation of experience. This 
interpretation necessarily brings the discussion to Brightman's epis-
temological position, but before considering these views, it would ap-
pear advisable to oonsider his view of experience from another vantage 
point. 
Brightman also believes that experience can be looked upon as a 
structure that includes, in every phase of it, some activity, some ra-
tional form, and some brute fact. By activity, he means the purposing 
of some agency (a self or God) or the resultant activity of suCh pur-
posing. By form, he means that this activity conforms to the laws of 
reason and embodies rational principles. The brute faciE refer to 
nthe ultimate qualities (or qualia) of experience, the sense qualities, 
l. POR, 163. 
2. POR, 347 • 
3. POR, 348. 
the pleasures and pain, the desires and impulses of experience.n1 
He goes on to observe that Hall experience is a constant activity, 
which seeks to impose the forms of reason on the content of brute 
fact.n 2 
2. Brightman 1 s Epistemic Dualism: Brightmants epistemic 
position has direct bearing upon his arguments for and his view 
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of God. "Knowledge, 11 for Brightman, "is to be distinguished from 
experience.n3 Every actual experience has a double reference; nit 
refers ••• to our own consciousness as we have it; it also refers to 
objects not identical with our experience of them. 114 This distinc-
tion brings out the two key conceptions :in Brightman •s position;; 
The Situation Experienced and the Situation Believed-in. "A Situa-
ti.on Experienced is a· self, a person or an experient, because it is 
a self-experiencing ~ole which includes thinking, choosing, remember-
ing, anticipat:ing, and purposing, as well as feeling and sensing.u5 
This datum self is more unified than James r nspan of consciousness 11 
and Whitehead's 11actual occasion.n It is narrower in scope, however, 
than Dewey's situation \1\hich rtincludes, if it does not entirely con-
. 6 
sist of, Situations Believed-in.n 
The Situation Believed-in, of course, is the reference of our 
llknmvledge-claim. n A knowledge-claim is set up when reference is 
made to nany supposeQ. object (be it •real r or 'imaginary t) • 11 This 
Situation Believed-in is demanded by the necessity for some rational 
l. POR, 320. 
2. POR, 320. 
3. POR, 163. 
4. POR, 163. 
5. POR, 348. 
6. POR, 348-349. 
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explanation for the changes in the initial datum. Thus, solipsism 
is avoided 11by the demands of action and reason. 11 
Truth, for Brightman, is to be understood as agreement between 
subject and object: na proposition is true if what it asserts cor-
responds to the object about which the assertion is made .n1 However, 
correspondence is not the criterion of truth. This is because propo-
sitions are about 11the past, the future, the timeless or some combi-
nation of them, n and on account of the very nature of time, it is im-
possible to compare a present proposition with what is not now present. 
Rather, Brightman rs criterion of truth is coherence. Coherence in-
eludes both inductive and deductive types of logical inquiry. It sig-
nifies 11 systematic consistency, 11 the n sticking together of a compre-
hensive, synoptic view of experience.n According to this criterion, 
any judgment is true, if it is both self-consistent and coherently 
connected with the total system of judgments of a person. 
3. Brightman's Empirical Methodology! Basically, Brightman rs 
methoclology is an attempt to give cognizance to all aspects of exper-
ience. It trdoes not require that its field be cleared of all opponents 
for the reason that it is so inclusive and liberal in its attitude as 
~o find a place for all points of view, all types of belief, and even 
all objections to itself.n2 
In this approach, reason and experience are not to be dichotomized 
for reason is a nfunct:Lon of experiencen as nexperience is a movement 
towards rational totality. 113 This view of reason and experience is, 
l. POR, 126. 
2. POR, 6-7. 
3. Art. (1931), 155 ~ 
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in Brightman 1 s own words, a fillldamental change that took place in 
his thought in the past two decades. Needless to say, he attributes 
this change primarily to a deeper understanding of Hegel, whom he 
qalls nthe empiricist of consciousness. 11 
Hegel has led me to see that true rational-
ism is simply the principle of confronting every 
part of experience with our view of the whole, 
while true empiricism is the principle of ac-
cepting only that view of the whole which is 
honestly built up by observation of the accept-
able parts of experience.l 
It must be noted that certain critics have objected to this over-
·all view of experience and method. Martin in his work, Empirical 
· ·Philosophies of Religion_, argues that Brightman is guilty of what 
2 
Loewenberg has called the rtfallacy of the suppressed correlative.n 
Martin asks, 11-why should the 'Whole enterprise of thought be called a 
method, when it admittedly includes all methods? 113 It would appear 
that Martin has confused methodology and criterion of truth. He fails 
to realize that although Brightman attempts to give cognizance to all 
aspects of experience, he does by his criterion of coherence bring or-
der into apparent chaos. Brightman 1s approach is more than a mere 
adding together of methods; it is an attempt to find the common de-
m.ominator of what have been looked upon as mutually exclusive methods. 
He believes that he does find this in his conception of experience ~Dd 
his criterion of truth, coherence. 
B. BRIGHTMAN 1S CONCEPI'ION OF THE PERSON 
From the above discussion, it is obvious that the person or person-
l.Art. (1939), 276. 
2. · Loewenberg, Art.(l940) 281-289. 
3. Martin, EPR, 38. 
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ality is the basic metaphysical category for Brightman. In fact~ it 
can be said that all is personality or the result of its activity. 
Two basic as:Pects of Brightman 1 s conception of personality will be 
emphasized: his definition of human personality, and his conception 
of human purpose. 
1. Human Personality: In attempting to arrive at a coherent 
def:inition of human personality, Brightman offers a basic distinction 
between selves and persons. 
a. ·selves: Brightman defines a self as 11 any and every conscious 
· l · 1 1 l·t b 111 experlence~ 1owever slmp e or comp ex may e. It is any conscious 
situation experienced as a whole. The minimal existing self exper-
iences time and space transcendenpe, at least some form of process and 
conation~ awareness of meaning, sense qualities~ response to its en-
vironment, and privacy. 2 The minimal self is not necessarily aware of 
all these properties of its existence, but for Brightman, they consti-
tute the sine qua ~ of consciousness. It must be emp~asized that by 
this definition of a minimal self, he does not mean to emphasize any 
form of panpsychism. He notes:. npanpsychism •••• seems to have too little 
evidence for its monads and to expect too much from them.n3 Thus, 
there is a definite break be~reen the most minimal self and the rest 
of nature that, for llim, is the result of God 1 s activity. 
b •. Persons: In contrast to a self, 11 a person is a self that 
is potentially self-conscious, rational~ and ideal. 11 4 They exhi-
bit a more complex self-consciousness, the influence of moral, 
l. POR, 350. 
2. POR, 351. 
3. ITP, 303. 
4. POR, 350. 
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aesthetic, and religious values, a more extended nspecious present, 11 
free purposive self-control, conceptual thought and reason, response 
to social and spiritual environments, and an awareness of privacy ex-
hibited in a need to communicate.1 Of these emergent traits of per-
sonality, 11the most important are the consciousness of imperative 
2 
norms, freedom and reason. 11 Basic to these three norms is the con-
ception of purpose. He goes on to note, nthus we have established a 
level of purpose as the criterion of distinguishing selves from per-
sons.113 It is to this concept that the discussion now turns. 
2. Human Purpose: Human purpose is basic to this discussion 
because it points the way to Brightman's view of values 11\ihich, on the 
one hand, f~rm the core of his argument for God, and, on the•other, 
bring the problem of disvalue to the forefront.. Brightman defines 
human purpose as nthe conscious fulfillment of a desire.n4 In the 
discussion of his view of experience, it was noted that one of his 
three basic categories of existence is activity. It would also appear 
that if there is to be more than sheer random activity, it must be 
based upon desire. Immediately, the question arises as to just what 
constitutes desire for Brightman. Of course, for Brightman all desire, 
at least from a metaphysical point of view, is based upon value exper-
iences.. Before considering his conception of value, however, it is 
necessary to note how those value experiences are organized or ful-
filled. These considerations will bring the discussion to Brightman rs 
view of what he calls the dialectic of desire. It is dialectic 
l. POR~ 16-19. 
2. POR, 371. 
3. POR, 371. 
4. Art.(l939), 277. 
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because it is a search £or completeness and wholeness. It is a 
desire for fulfillment~ and every value-claim, no matter how rudi-
mentary, is a desire £or fulfillment. 
The most basic and universal desire is for pleasure (enjoying), 
but this pleasure must be for and of something. Consequently, this 
desire leads to physical things (having). The reflective mind soon 
notes, however~ that mere 11 having11 is not enough~ and that the ful-
.fillment o.f desire is more dependent 11 on active transaction with 
things than on things themselves. 111 Thus, a third stage o.f the d.ia-
lectic is reached that is activity or doing. Re.flection brings out 
the fact that activity to be meaning.ful must be with other persons 
(sharing). Here, a new synthesis emerges that points to 11the truth 
that shared experience is a progressive realization od ideals. 112 
Ideals, o£ course~ L~volve planning~ and planning points to the basic 
problem o.f the .fulfillment of ideals. It is on this level of the 
fulfillment o.f ideals that arises what Brightman calls 11 the antinomy 
of the ideal.n3 The thesis o.f this antinomy is: 11 In order to be va-
lid, ideals must in some sense lie beyond all human personalities as 
their objective goal and judge. u4 The antithesis is: 11 Ideals can be 
real only as the concepts and acknowledged purposes o.f minds.u5 For 
Brightman~ the synthesis of this antinomy points to a Supreme Person, 
rrguiding the universe by its ideals, 11 as the objective ground of 
ideals and personality. The final stage of the dialectic then arises 
in which worship and cooperation with this Supreme Person are willed. 
l. P0R, 253. 
2. POR, 2.54. 
4. POR, 255. 
5. POR~ 255. 
3. POR~ 235. 
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However, one basic fact has been left out of this dialectic. 
11It omits the plain and inevitable fact of evil.n1 Although it 
is permissable to leave out this factor to indicate a phase of 
human thought, a complete synthesis cannot be achieved until the 
evil factors of life have been brought into the scheme of things. 
Thus, evil is found to be thwarting human purpose, and if 11all 
personal living is purposing, n a coherent account of evil must be 
attempted. 
The above discussion, however, has been concerned with only 
the evaluational or ideal aspect of experience. Consequently, be-
fore considering the evil factors of life, it is necessary to con-
sider the reference of the ideal, the value experience itself. "An 
ideal is a definition of value; the value is the reality defined.11 2 
C. BRIGHTlVlAN tS CONCEPI'ION OF VALUE 
The importance of value for Brightman is strikingly apparent in 
his definition of religion. 
Religion is concerned about experiences 
which are regarded as of supreme value; de-
votion toward a power or powers believed to 
originate, increase, and conserve these 
iralues; and some suitable expression of this 
concern and devotion, whether through sym-
bolic rites or through other individual and 
social conduct.3 
Before considering what Brightman considers to be the uniqueness 
of religious values, it would appear advisable to note, firqt of all, 
a few fundamental definitions that he makes in regard to values. This 
l. POR, 259. 
2. POR, 91. 
3. POR, 17. 
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discussion will be followed, secondly, by his view of religious 
valuese 
l. Some Fundamental Definitions: For Brightman, a value is 
11whatever is actually liked, prized, esteemed, desired, approved or 
enjoyed by anyone at any time. 111 It is trthe existing realization 
of desire.n This broad general definition is broken down still fur-
ther into intrinsic and instrumental values. An intrinsic value is 
trwhatever i$ desired or enjoyed for its own sake, as an end in it-
2 
self • 11 As this definition implies, instrumental values are contri-
butory, mediate, causal, or means to intrinsic values. Brightman 
goes on to note that although all intrinsic values can serve as in-
strumental values, it does not follow that all instrumental values 
can sometimes be intrinsic. One other basic concept is that of true 
value. A true value is an experience that is still valued nafter 
tests of analysis, practical consequences and coherent wholeness have 
been applied to the experience. 113 It is not to be confused with an 
intrinsic value, as an intrinsic-value claim can turn out to be false 
in the light of total experience .. 
Brightman also presents a table of values that is basic to this 
discussion because it points to the importance of religious values 
in his philosophical system. First, he notes two purely instrumen-
tal values, natural (the forces of nature) and economic, whose only 
value lies in the fact that they are instrumental to the production 
of intrinsic values. Second, there are the three lower intrinsic 
l. POR, 88. 
2. POR, 89. 
3. POR, 93. 
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values: bodily values, recreational values, and work values. They 
are called lower because they refer to a smaller area of experience, 
and are more dependent upon the other values for their own worth. And 
finally, there are the higher intrinsic values: social values, charac-
ter values, aesthetic values, intellectual values and religious values. 
These values are higher because they are more inclusive of experience 
as a -whole. The basic fact about these intrinsic values is their 
uniqueness and coalescence. And, still more basic to this discussion, 
is the relation of religious values to this system of values. This 
aspect of Brightman's thought will now be considered. 
2. The Uniqueness of Religious Values: From his definition of 
experience, his methodology, and his view of values, it is apparent 
that by the uniqueness of religious values, Brightman does not mean 
that religious values are completely distinct and have no relation to 
other values. Rather, their uniqueness lies in the fact that through 
the realization of them "man takes an attitude towards value experience 
as a whole and towards its dependence on powers beyond man. 111 They are 
characterized by unique sense of dependence upon the ground of the uni-
verse as distinguished from any particular environmental conditions) 
by the mystical tone of worship and prayer~ and by a consciousness of 
divine aid and of submission to cosmic purpose. 
Of course, for Brightma.D, a coherent interpretation of these value; 
experiences~ and, particularly, the religious experience, points to 
~ 
some form of a theistic hypothesis. Furthermore, since all reality 
l. POR, 99. 
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must be related to consciousness, and since all values are personal, 
it can only follow that the coherent n groundu of them is a conscious 
and pu1~oseful Supreme Person. Thus, the dialectic of desire leads 
the person from the desire of pleasure through the various value ex-
periences to a 11 desire for the Supreme Person11 and a consequent dis-
satisfaction 1r.ith all partial value-achievements. 
As in the dialectic of desire, one basic fact has been left out 
of this discussion of value--disvalue. Here again, by the very na-
ture of his methodology, Brightman must give cognizance to this fact. 
Needless to say, it is in his treatment of disvalue that he breaks 
with Bowne and F~udson. It is to Brightman 1 s empirical treatment of 
evil that the discussion now turns. 
D. BRIGHTMA.N 1 S E1lPIRIO.AL APPROACH TO THE PROBI,"RM OF EVIL 
There are two basic tenets in Brightman's approach to evil that 
must be noted: on the one hand, he argues that there are intrinsic 
evils (disvalues) in this world, and on the other, he is equally in-
sistent that these evils must be noted and accounted for in the co-
herent scheme of things. This second tenet is apparent from his 
criticism of Bowne and Knudson noted above. 
1. Intrinsic Evils: Brightman notes five kinds of intrinsic 
evils that must be faced in experience. First, there is the fact of 
incoherent wills. Although an incoherent 1vill cru1 also be looked 
upon as partly a moral evil, it is the natural aspect of it, the ba-
sic weala1ess that all persons experience in their ¥filling, that is 
here being emphasized. Second, there is the intellectual evil of 
ignorance. Here again, this evil can be looked upon at times as being 
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partly moral, but it is also a natural evil in the face of the un-
avoidability of ignorance. Maladjustment can be considered as the 
third intrinsic evil. 11Social maladjustment is one of' the worst 
evils of this type •111 Fourth, there is the factor of incompetence. 
Brightman is referring to the lack of ability of all kinds with which 
so many are burdened. And, finally, there are the dysteleological 
surd evils of life. Brightman does admit that the first types of in-
trinsic evils can sometimes be n superseded by internal development, n 
but 11a dysteleological surd is a type of evil which is inherently 
and irreducibly evil and contains within itself no principle of devel-
opment or improvement.n 2 And still further, llif there be any truly 
surd evil, then it. is not in any sense an intrinsic good, good comes 
in spite of it, not because of it.n3 
2. Evil as a Religious Problem: For Brightman, evil can be 
looked upon as a religious problem because, on the one hand, there 
is the question of whether good is ultimate, and, on the other, there 
is the difficulty of achieving good. Of course, the problem of be-
lieving good to be ultimate arises because of the problem of evil. 
Thus, God must be of such a nature to insure the religious conscious-
ness that good will always have the upper hand. Also, the difficulty 
of achieving good arises out of the fact of evil. Here, a belief in 
a God that ultimately supports the good becomes even more imperative. 
11The essence of religion is that the highest power in the universe is 
on the side of value in this age-long struggle between good and evil. 114 
l. POR, 245. 
2. POR, 245, 246. 
3. POR, 246. 
4. POR, 249. 
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E~ RESUL'.DANT GOD OF BRIGHTMAN 18 EMPIRICAL APPROACH TO EVIL 
Having admitted that there are hindrances to value (surd evils) 
that cannot be traced to human sin or finitude, Brightman's next 
problem is to attempt ~D account of these recalcitrant factors and 
yet preserve the religious adequacy of the resultant God. The main 
concern here will be with the resultant God in the light of Bright-
man's view of surd evil. There are two basic characteristics of this 
God that distinguish it from the traditional personalistic God: The 
Given and God's finiteness. Th~ will be considered in this order. 
l. The Given: Without a doubt, this aspect of Brightman 1s 
thought has been subject to more misinterpretations and more criticisms 
than any other aspect. I:b can be argued that this is understandable 
because of the terminology used, The Given. It would appear, however, 
that far too many critics have failed to come to grips with the basic 
reasons for Brightman's use of this concept, and have allowed precon-
ceived emotional and religious views of tl:! e nature of God to prejudice 
their avowedly objective appraisal of his position. Some of these cri-
tiCisms will be briefly considered in the final evaluation of Bright-
man's God. 
The Given serves a basic metaphysical function in Brightman's phi-
losophical position, and the following quotation brings out this func-
tion. 
The Given comsists of the eternal uncreated 
laws of reason and also of equally eternal and 
uncreated processes of nonrational consciousness 
which exh-ibit all the ultimate qualities of sense 
objects (qualia), disorderly impulses and desires, 
such experiences as pain and suffering, the forms 
of space and tfume, and whatever in God is the 
source o£ surd evil. The common characteristic 
o£ all that is 11 given11 (in the technical sense) 
is, £irst, that it is eternal within the exper-
ience o£ God and hence had no other origin than 
God 1 s eternal being; and, secondly, that it is 
not a product o£ will or created activity.l 
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It is apparent .from this quotation that The Given has two as-
pects! the .formal aspect (laws o£ reason) and the content aspect 
_(that out o£ which the will o.f God through the use o.f reason eter-
nally creates and £ounds the world). The eternally creating will 
constitutes the third metaphysical aspect o£ God. Another way o.f 
considering these metaphysical aspects of God is to look upon them 
as activity (will), .form (reason), and brute .fact. 2 
It must be emphasized that Brightman insisU> that under no cir-
cumstances can the will, on the one hand, and The Given, on the other, 
be looked upon in a dualistic manner. God is a complex unity, and 
the~e aspects o.f God are the result o.f an attempt to a:rTive at a co-
herent interpretation o.f God based upon an analysis o£ the experience 
of man. 
Thus, The Given serves a basic metaphysical function in Bright-
man 1 s position. It is that which, so to speak, o.f.fers the raw ma-
terial and £orm. out o£ which the will o£ God creates. It is meaning-
£ul to speak o£ God1 s will as being limited by The Given in the sense 
that God 1 s will cannot arbitrarily change the laws of reason or the 
content o£ The Given. Also God's knowledge is limited in regard to 
the precise nature o.f the future because of human freedom and the 
nature o£ The Given (the urnrilled, nonvoluntary aspect). 
l. POR, 337 
2. POR, 319-321. 
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2. The Finiteness of God: Along with the concept of the Given, 
Brightman 1 s view of the finite-infinite God has aroused much criticism 
that has failed to grasp, on the whole, the problem with which Bright-
man is wrestling. Here again, these criticisms will be briefly noted 
in the final evaluation of Brightman 1 s position. The main concern 
here is to bring out exactly what Brightman means by a finite or li-
mited God. Two basic points will be emphasized: the limitation of 
God's will and God a·s the 1_1 Controller of The Given. n 
a .. The Limitation of God's Will: It would appear th..at, for 
Brightman, God is limited only in regard to his will. ''Strictly we 
should speak of a God whose will is finite rather than a finite God; 
for even the finite God is absolute in the sense of being the ulti-
- 1 
mate source of all creat1on.n Thus, it is the power of God 1 s will 
that is limited: it is limited to TP.e Given. In other words, for 
Brightman, God's will is not all of him. In other respects he is in-
finite, because 11he is infinite in time and space, by his unbegun and 
unending duration and by his inclusion of all nature within his 
. • 112 
exper1ence. 
b. God as the ncontroller of The Givenn: The following quo-
tation brings out the essence of Brightman's view on this point. 
God's control of The Given means that he 
never allows The Given to run wild, that he 
always subjects it to law and uses it, as far 
as possible, as an instrument for realizing 
the ideal good. Yet, the divine control does 
not mean complete determination; for in some 
situations, The Given, with its purposeless 
I~ POR, 337. 
2. POR, 337. 
processes, constitutes so great an obstacle 
to divine willing that the utmost endeavors 
of God lead to a blind alley and. temporary 
defeat. At this point, God1 s control means 
that no defeat or :frustration is :final; that 
the will of God, partially thwarted by ob-
stacles in the chaotic Given, :finds new 
avenues of advance, and forever moves on in 
the cosmic creation of new values.l 
F. EVALUATION OF BRIGHTMAN 1S FINITE-INFINITE GOD 
Knudson, in his work, The Do cti·ine of Redemption, points out 
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what he considers to be the two :fundamental criticisms of Brightman1 s 
position: on the one hand, "it compro~ses the divine unity by its 
distinction between the will and The Given 11 , and, on the other, the 
11limiting of the divine powern raises serious qualifications as to 
the religious adequacy of Brightman1 s God. Both of these criticisms 
are concerned with the two :fundamental characteristics of Brightman r s 
God already noted above, and they will be considered along with other 
criticisms of the same general nature. Another basic criticism that 
will be noted is that Brightman 1 s solution is no solution at all. 
Although these criticisms can be considered as the ones most often 
noted in any critique of Brightman 1 s approach to evil, it would ap-
pear that there is one other basic criticism that has never been 
fully developed by any of his critics: it is a dualism within The 
Given itself. It results from a too sharp distinction between form 
and fact. These criticisms will be considered in the above order. 
L The Dualism Between God1 sWill and The Given: Probably the 
most repeated criticism of Brightman 1 s position is that ultimately it 
l. POR, 3]8. 
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ends in a dualism between God 1s will and The Given. In the light 
of much of the terminology used by him in describing the relation 
of the will to The Given, this criticism is understandable, al-· 
though Whether it is completely justifiable or not is another ques-
tion. Many examples can be cited in "Which he can be interpreted in 
a dualistic manner. For example, in his Philosophy of Religion, he 
states: 11God 1s control of The Given means that he never allows it 
to ~wild, that he always subjects it to the laws of reason, and 
~ it, as far as possible, as an instrument for reali~ing the 
l 
ideal good. n 
Many critics have objected to this apparently dualistic factor. 
Knudson argues that the distinction between the divine will and the 
divine nature is vacuous, nand the divine nature apart from the di-
vine will is nonexistent.n2 Some have found The Given to be liThe 
Devil in God.n Macintosh, in discussing this point, wonders how 
Brightman 11 finds it possible to worship what may still be called God, 
but what turns out to be, albeit a person, a conception of God and 
devil in one.n3 Kingdon notes, 11Lucifer, thrown out of heaven, has 
4 taken refuge in the nature of God. 11 Baker argues along the same 
lines: nGod is not God, but devil, unless he be good ..... God to be 
good must be good through and through .n5 
Another way of considering this apparent dualism within God is to 
argue that Brightman, at times, apparently identifies God 1s goodness 
1.· POR, emphasis added. 
2. Knudson, DR, 206. 
4. Kingdon, Rev. (1931) ~ 131-132. 
5. Baker, OLG, 179. 
3. Macintosh, Art.(l932), 9. 
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with his will thus implying a dualism between the 11 good will of God 
and The Given." In discussing the finiteness of God, Brightman does 
note that although God's will can be looked upon as being limited by 
The Given, 11 arguments for the objectiVity of ideals give ground for 
l 
the postulate that his will for goodness and love is unlimited. u 
Ross notes on this point that Brightman apparently ascribes perfec-
tion to God 1s will (goodness and love) and perfectability uto the 
darker side of God's nature. 11 Thus, it can be argued that nwe have 
a dualism or tension between that which is entirely good and what is 
not good, never has been good, and, is only good-for-the-future in the 
sense that it is eternally capable of being improved." 2 
Another way of interpreting this so-called dualism is to argue 
that in the light of the :fact that for Brightman all force in the uni-
verse is of the nature of purpose, he has a basic internal inconsistency 
when he at times apparently implies that The Given is a force--a pur-
poseless force. F,or example, he speaks of The Given as consisting of 
"disorderly impulses and desires, ••• ani whatever in God is the source 
of surd evil.n3 Knudson makes refE;lrence to this point although he does 
not fully develop it, and Ross believes it to be the real basic dualism 
in Brightman •s thought. He notes that Brightman 11in postulating The 
Given has--without sensing it--abandoned a spiritual monism for a dual-
ism or pluralism. n4 He sums up his view by arguing that this incon= 
sistency points to rta definite pluralism which recognizes other factors 
in the universe besides God and God's created products: factors, 
l. POR, 337 .. 
2. Ross, PPE, 41. 
3. POR, 337. 
4. Ross, PPE, 48. 
105 
indeed, which introduce a degree of irrationality and indeterminacy 
into the picturee"l 
The following basic question arises in regard to this interpre-
tation of Brightman's posit:Lon: Does it represent the tenor of his 
v{ew? P. A. Bevtocci, one of the most astute critics and followers 
of Brightman's view, notes in his work Introduction to the Philosophy 
of Religion that this nfear is· understandable but unfounded. It He 
goes on to note that these criticisms overlook "the empirical complex-
ity of any personality, as well as the experience of control. 112 The 
basic point is that the nonrational Given is woven into the very warp 
and woof of the being of God as are his will and reason, and 11 the plane 
which we distinguish as tcontent' rather than form or activity is re-
sponsible to control by rational will and as such must be within the 
framework of the laws of God's nature.n3 It would appear that Bertocci 
is essentially correct in this interpretation, and that those who cri~ 
ticize Brightman on this point have failed to grasp the metaphysical 
orientation of his position. 
2. The Religious Adequacy of Brightman 1s God: The second most 
repeated criticism of Brightman 1s pos.ition, stemming from the limita-
tion of the divine will, is that his God is religiously inadequate. 
Knudson notes: 11The theory in questionffirightman 'E7 by limiting the 
divine person compr0mises also the divine goodness and so fails to 
1. Ross, PPE, 50. 
2. Bertocci, IPR, 436. 
3. Bertocci, IPR, 437. 
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meet the deepest demands· of religious faith. 111 Lewis also makes the 
same criticism: liThe only God we can completely believe in and com-
pletely trust is a sovereign God, or at least a God believed to be 
2 
sovereign.n Also, on this general point, Wieman notes: 11All I can 
say is that when I love, serve, and adore God, I do not love, serve 
and adore that unspeakable horror of evil which is the Given nature 
of God~"3 Others from the more orthodox Christian position argue 
that Brightman's God is not re~igiously adequate because it does not 
take on the sufferings of the world freely.4 
In general, these views would appear to reflect personal religious 
convictions, and, consequently, it is not possible to look upon them 
as philosophical criticisms of Brightman's position. The basic ques-
tion is: Despite the limitations of his will, is God always in con-
trol? Brightman, does give sufficient evidence that the good will of 
God has always been and will always be in control, and consequently 
there is no justifiable reason to fear that evil will eventual-ly de-
throne the good. 
3. No Solution Charged: Many critics have claimed that Bright-
man 1s proposed hypothesis is ultimately no solution at all. Beiswanger 
argues: 11None of the antinomies disappear, their locus is merely 
shifted-this time to a place within the psychic life of the deity .n5 
Lewis notes that Brightman 1s theory "only pushes the problem of evil 
further back: it does not solve it, any more than Milton, in Paradise 
1. Knudson, DR, 206. 4. Brightman, Art.(l932), 137. 
2. Lewis, GAO, 53-54. 5. Beiswanger, Rev.(l93l), 446. 
3. Wieman, Rev.(l932), 1205 
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Lost, solved it by assuming an evil outside of and before the world.ul 
Wieman and Horton also contend that Brightman's view is a mere re.form-
ation of the problem. 2 Knudson observes: 
There is nothing in the nature o.f 
The Given that gives us the slightest in-
sight into the reason why its resistance 
to the divine Vlrill should lead to any spe-
cific evil •••• The Given is merely a s.y.mbol 
of the vague and abstract idea of a limit-
ing necessity, to which God is forced to 
submit. It throws E9_ light whatsoever upon 
the concrete evils of life.3 
---
It would appear that these criticisms have failed to grasp the ba-
sic axiological orientation of Brightman1 s position. For Brightman, 
evil (disvalue) is that which inter.feres with the realization o.f the 
good (value). The true value o.f good is the realization and creative 
growth or fulfillment of personality. Consequently, such factors as 
incoherence, ignorance, maladjustment, and incompetence can be looked 
upon as intrinsically evil. Therefore, Brightman r s main problem is to 
offer a ~etaphysical setting for both good and evil. He believes ~hat 
he does this by his conception of God as will, rational form, and brute 
fact. 
4. The Dualism within The Given: It would appear that there is 
a. dualism or at least an internal tension in Brightman 1 s thought, but 
it is not a dualism betw·een God's will and The Given as most critics 
have attempted to argue. Rather it is a dualism within The Given it-
self: a dualism or tension between the form and content o.f The Given. 
Moreover, it >rill be argued that this dualism results primarily from 
l. Lewis, GAO, 55. 
2. Wieman and Horton, GOR, 356. 
3. Knudson, DOR, 212, emphasis added. 
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his treatment o.f evil, and, more specifically, it can be traced 
directly to his view of surd ev~. Also, it can be charged that 
this dualism can be :braced back to his atte:inpt to bring together in 
his methodology 11what has been called transcendental11 and nwhat has 
been called empiricalu .factors in experience. It is beyond the.scope 
o.f this thesis, however, to consider all the rami.fications of this ap-, 
parent dualism. The main concern here is to isolate this tension in 
regard to his view o.f evil. 
To understand completely this dualism, it will be necessary to re-
-view briefly Brightman 1 s view of The Given. , For him, The Given can be 
considered .from two .frames o.f re.ference. · On the one hand, it can be 
looked p.pon from the eternal, uncreated laws o.f reason, 11including lo-
gic, mathemati~l ·relations, and Platonic Ideas. 111 On the other hand_, 
it can be approached from the brute .fact that constitutes The Given. 
Another way of understanding The Given is from the conception o.f .form 
and content. From this point of view the brute .fact can be looked upon 
as being the content o.f the .form (including the Platonic Ideas). 2 St,ill 
another way of approaching this view o.f The Given, at least as .far as 
the Platonic Forms and brute fact are concerned, is to consider them as 
a distinction betl-reen universals, and particulars. Although Brightman 
does not go into a detailed discussion of what he means by Platoni~ 
Ideas in his A Philosophy of Religion; it would appear that he has in 
mind such traditional concepts as truth, beauty, goodness, justice_, and 
all universals. It is at this particular point of the relation of these 
l. POR_, 337, footnote. 
2. POR, 320. 
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Platonic Ideas to the brute fact that this apparent internal dualism 
or tension develops. 
It would appear advisable to give some consideration to the 
epistemological and metaphysical function of Platonic Ideas for 
Brightman 1 s philosophical system. Basically_, from the metaphysical 
point of view it would appear that they are the presuppositions 
of all 11 formal'l or conceptual experience: they are that to which 
all experience must conform. (Apparently for Brightman, logical 
and mathematical relations account for certain relationships of 
the Platonic Forms.) From the epistemological standpoint, along 
with the mathematical and logical relations, they are the pre-
supposition of all thought and lmowledge. Of course, these Pla-
tonic Forms legislate for only the structural aspect of exper-
ience; the non-rational given is the source of the content as-
pect. Also, these nvo aspects (Platonic Ideas and brute fact or 
universals and particulars), for Brightman, are inextricably bound 
together, and can be separated only for purposes of analysis. 1 
(Needless to say, the will (activity) is al-so inseparable from 
The Given except for purposes of analysis, but this aspect as 
well as the mathematical .and logical parts of the formal aspect 
of The Given are not directly concerned with the problem being 
isolated here.) On this particular poli1t of the cohesiveness of 
the Platonic Ideas and brute fact (or 1.miversals and particulars), 
Brightman notes in an article entitled 11Universals and Particularstt: 
1. Art. (1943), 9. 
Universals and particulars although lo-
gically distinguishable~ are not metaphysically 
distinct entities •••• Our inspection of the func-
tions of universals and particulars in exper-
ience shows that~ whatever they a:"eally are~ 
they do actually interpenetrate~ interweave, 
llO 
and interrelate in such a way as is forbidden 
by the logic both of traditional realism and 
traditional nominalism.l 
Now it would appear that-any ultimate concept or basio tenet 
of any form of Platonism (Brightman does refer to his system as a 
personalized Platonism) would need its formal or conceptual aspect~ 
this is just the point, however, at which Brightma._l'l is unclear. It 
is in the light of his view of Platonic Ideas and particulars that 
the internal dualism or tension arises because it is the content aspect 
of The Given that Brightman emphasizes j_11 regard to su2~ evil. In 
discussing this aspect he notes that it co1,1tains "whatever in God 
is the source of surd evil.n2 Now~ considering that Brightman in-
sists that under no circumstances can this surd evil be_ considered 
as even having a parasitic dependence on the good, it would seem 
that if he is to be completely consistent he would have to insist 
that there is an Idea or universal of surd evil in the formal as-
pect of The Given. If this is not the case, then he is apparently 
faced with both epistemological and metaphysical difficulties. On 
the one hand~ how is knowledge of evil possible, and, on the other, 
how can he speak of evil being an uilitifuate metaphysical principle 
if it does not have its formal counte11Xlrt in the rational given. 
Yet~ in none of his religious works does Brightman squarely face 
l. Art. (1943), 9. 
2. POR, 337. 
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this problem of a Platonic Idea or universal of evil; it is always 
the content aspect that is emphasized in regard to evil. 
It is true that in the article on universals and particulars., 
Brightman does speak of uuniversal evil. u nuniversals are surely not 
all excellent~ There are universals of evil as well as of good; uni-
. 1 
versals of error as well as truth. n Unfortunately Brightman does not 
elaborate this statement; even if he does mean to imply that there are 
universals of evil, he is still faced with difficUlties of another na-
ture. Saying there is surd evil, that is not a form of parasitic or 
incomplete good, 2 it can be argued that he is faced Yrith an ultimate 
good and evil prii1ciple--a yin yang movement. This would come about 
because the universal or Idea of surd evil wo1.1ld be eternal with the 
universal or Idea of Good, and it is difficult to conceive of it as 
ever coming under the control of God 1 s good vdll. It is true that 
Brightman speaks of God continuously coming better to understand and 
to control evil, but this conception appears to be correct only if 
it is the content aspect of The Ghven that is the source of surd evil. 
If there is a universal surd evil, however, then perhaps at times this 
principle of evil does control God 1 s will. Of course, such a sit1.1-a-
tion would apparently overthrow Brightmanrs contention that God 1 s 
will always controls The Given for the good. 
Thus Brightman would appe~r to face a basic dilemma. On the one 
hand, if he argues, as the tenor of his religious works imply, that 
there is no ultimate Idea or universal. of surd evil, then he is faced 
both with the question of the knowledge of evil and its ontological 
1. Art.(l943), 6. 
2. POR, 264-265. 
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existence. This predicament, of course, undermines the basic thesis 
of his religious position which is to offer a coherent account of 
both evil and good. On the other hand, if he insists that there is 
an Idea or universal of surd evil, then he is faced with an eternal 
conflict within the formal aspect of The Given. In the light of 
this form of evil, there is every reason to believe that evil is as 
strong today as it was yesterday or will be in the unforseeable fu-
ture. Consequently, it is hardly meaningful to speak of God bring-
ing The Given more and more under his control. Needless to say, this 
apparently undermines completely the religious adequacy of Bright-
man1 s God. 
It would appear that the only way Brightman can avoid either 
horn of this dilemma is to recast his view of evil. He would have to 
admit that there is no such thing as an ultimate surd evil: it is 
some form of a parasitic or incomplete good. The very fact that 
Brightman changed the wording of the earlier printings of his -!_ 
Philosophy of Religion, from the statement that under no condi-
tions could surd evil even be an instrumental good to the conclu-
sion that it could serve as an instrumental good, indicates that 
he may have been possibly moving in this direction. If universals 
and particulars are as inextricably bound together as he insists 
they are, then it is indeed difficult to envision a surd evil--
a universal or particular fact that is in and of itself evil. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMA.TION OF CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL EVALUATION 
The main task in this final chapter will be to sunnnarize brief-
ly the final conclusions concerning the treatment of the problem of 
evil by Bowne, Knudson, and Brightman and to attempt a coherent evalu-
ation of these conclusions. In the light of the fact that certain 
difficulties were discovered in each of the respective treatments 
of evil, the final conclusions of this thesis must be of a tenta-
tive nature. Consequently, the primary concern will be to point 
out some of the difficulties in regard to evil that personalists 
must face and attempt to resolve if they hope to offer a coherent 
account of evil from a personalistic metaphysical or theological 
position. In attempting to accomplish this task the following 
points will be emphasized. First, the overall question of the 
relation of God to evil will be considered. This presentation 
should help to orient the discussion in particular for a final 
consideration of the difficulties in Bowne and Knudson in regard 
to evil, which will be considered secondly. Third, Brightman 1 s 
position will be discussed with particular attention being paid 
to the tension within The Given. Finally, as just indicated a-
bove, what would appear to be some of the basic difficulties 
concerning evil that must be faced by personalists will be noted. 
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.A. GOD IN RELATION TO EVIL 
The main concern here is to review briefly the basic arguments .for 
and against theistic absolutism, on the one hand, and theistic finitism, 
on the other, in regard to evil. Brightman raises three basic ques-
tions that for him bring out the issues at stake on this particular pro-
blem.1 The first one has to do with the question of whether good and 
evil are to be explained away.. In general this view argues that they are 
both purely subjective experiences of man and have no ultimate metaphy-
sical or religious significance. This neutralistic view need not detain 
the discussion as obviously none of the men in this thesis have serious-
ly considered this view of evil in relation to God. The second question 
is concerned with the problem of whether 11 evil is really good. n For 
Brightman, ultimately all absolutist views can be reduced to some ver-
sion of this question. The objections to it will be examined closely 
when the absolutist pqsition is considered. Finally, there is the ques-
tion of whether a coherent account both of the "evil of eviln and the 
11 good of goodll is an adequate solutic:n to the p:- oblem of evil. Needless 
to say, Brightman's finite God is an excellent defense of this view of 
the relation of God to evil. Here again, this question will be considered 
more closely in the ~scussion of theistic finitism. 
l. Theistic .Absolutism: For Brightman, there are two basic 
sources from which it can be argued for theistic absolutism. On the 
one hand, there is man's religious experience of an ideal or perfect 
good. Moreover, in the light of this ideal, man finds that much of the 
apparent evil of life does acquire meaning, and, still further, in the 
1. Brightman, POR, 277-280. 
face of this meaningful experience man goes on to interpret all of 
life in the light of this ideal. True, there is so much that does not 
fit into this ideal of the absolutist, nbut he retains his trust in the 
ideal and believes that somehow all apparent evil will be shown to be 
1 
real good. 11 
On the other hand, this same ideal found in the religious ex-
perience also springs from man 1 s logical nature. Through his logi-
cal nature man strives for an ideal of truth that somehow he believes 
must exist. Although he never reaches or experiences this ideal realm 
of truth, here again, as in the case of the religious ideal, he has 
complete faith that it does exist. Through a combination of the re-
ligious.and logical ideal man arrives at what he considers to be the 
true nature of God. For a religious empiricist like Brightman, how-
ever, certain facts have been left out of this argument that completely 
invalidate it, and it is to these facts that the discussion now turns. 
Brightman lists five arguments against theistic absolutism that 
are worth noting as they are all directly concerned with the problem 
of evil.2 First, there'is its appeal to ignorance. For Brightman, 
Knudsonts approach to evil is an excellent example of this approach~ 
Second, there is the 11 ascription of surd evil to divine will. 11 Third, 
the absolutist has a tendency to make good and evil indistinguishable. 
That is, if man cannot be sure of the evil in life, how can he be sure 
of the good? Is it not possible that his experience of good may be as 






that absolutism may cut the chord of moral endeavor. This possibility 
rests on the fact that if all evil is ultimately good in the eyes of 
the absolute, then why should man attempt to overcome the apparent 
evil when the world is already timelessly perfect for the absolute. 
Finally, there is the unempirical character of the absolutist approach. 
By this Brightman means that the absolutist, because of his predilec-
tion for a few experiences (those that point to the goodness and ab-
soluteness of God) derives a conception of God that cannot do justice 
to the vast ra_~ge of human experience that is not of the nature of the 
good, the true, or the beautiful. 
It need only be pointed out at this time that all of the above ob-
jections to theistic absolutism are based upon the basic premise of 
Brightman 1 s religious position that there is surd evil. As has al-
ready been noted in the discussion of Brightman, there are apparently 
certain basic difficulties in his position at this point. These dif-
ficulties, and their relation to theistic absolutism, will be given 
further consideration in the final evaluation of Brightman1 s position. 
2. Theistic Finitism: Just as all of Brightman 1 s arguments 
against theistic absolutism are ultimately concerned with the problem 
of evil, so are his arguments for a finite God based upon this fact. 1 
The arguments will be briefly summarized here, and connnent will be 
reserved until the final evaluation of his position. 
Brighunan's first argument for a finite God is that of evolution. 
More specifically, the tremendous waste and apparently unsuccessful 
1. Brightman, POR, 315-324. 
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experimentation point to a finite G~d. Of course~ purposeful creation 
and values are also an aspect of evolution, and, for Brightman, the 
only answer to this seemingly contradictory fact is some form of a 
finite God. Second, finitism offers the only coherent account of surd 
evil. Third, there is the empirical fact that goodness is more funda-
mental than power. This point brings out the difference between the 
absolute God that willfully founds surd evil (thus making goodness sub-
ordinate to power), and the finite God that, although its will is for 
the good, cannot but help to will surd evil because of his very nature. 
Of course, for Brightman the choice lies with the finite God with the 
infinitely good will. Fourth, there is Brightman 1s analysis of all ex-
perience into activity, rational form and brute fact that, for him, 
points to a limited God. God is limited in the sense that God does 
not create by fiat either the rat:i_onal form or the brute fact. His 
will is limited to these metaphysical facts, and apparently it is an 
element in the brute fact that is the cause of surd evil. And, finally, 
there is Brightmants insistence upon the empirical adequacy of his posi-
tion; empirically adequate~ that is, to the problem of evil. 
Brightman does list .certain objections to theistic finitism that 
will not be considered at this time. The more pertinent of these ar-
guments have already been discussed in the chapter on Brightman and 
need not be repeated at this time. As it was indicated in that discus-
sion it would appear that Brightman has adequately met these objections. 
Of course, there is still the apparent dualism or tsasion within Whe 
Given, and this point will be considered further in the sequel. 
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B. BOWNE 1 S AND KNUDSON 1S INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS 
With these general observations concer11ing both absolutism and 
~initism in the background, the discussion will now turn to a brie~ 
review o~ the conclusions concerning Bowne 1 s and Knudson's treatment 
o~ evil. As it was apparent in the discussion o~ their positions, 
both o~ them had certain internal contradictions. Bowne, on the one 
hand, having methodological di~~iculties, and Knudson, on the other, 
being ~aced with the ~ailure to ~allow consistenly an avowed theo-
logical position in regard to religious problems. Also, it was ap-
parent that, on the whole, these di~~iculties could be traced to their 
treatment o~ the problem o~ evil. Moreover, it was also apparent that 
Knudson to a certain extent overcame the methodological ~~iculties 
in Bowne 1 s position, but still ~ound himsel~ plagued with those o~ 
his awn. 
1. Bowne 1 s Dualistic Methodology: In the discussion o~ Bowne 
it was ~inally concluded that he had both rationalistic and pragmatic 
strands in his methodology.1 Furthermore, the pragmatic strands were 
primarily concerned with man 1 s moral and religious belie~~ and, still 
~urther, it was apparent that this pragmatic approach in the ~ield o~ 
moral and religious belie~s resulted primarily from the problem of 
evil. In general, the rationalistic strands were apparent ~rom Bowne 1 s 
belief in the doctrine o~ the creativity of the mind, on the one hand, 
and the trustworthiness o~ the mind and the intelligibility of the real 
world, on the other. In particular the ~ationalistic ideal was in con-
l. See above, 18-27. 
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trol when Bowne was concerned with his arguments for God and his con-
ception of the nature of God. In fact~ Bowne 1 s two basic arguments 
for the existence of God, the epistemological and the methodological, 
especially bring out the rationalistic bent in his thought. In 
these arguments the rationalistic ideal was in complete control~ and 
there is never a hint that all is not amenable to man 1 s rational 
nature. Also, it was shown that Bowne 1 s conception of the metaphysical 
nature of God reflects these rationalistic tenets. 
In considering God 1 s moral nature~ however, a change was detectable 
in Bowne 1 s methodology. Here he makes an appeal to subjective inter-
ests and tendencies that point .to God 1 s moral nature and that can be 
assumed to be real in default of positive disproof. Still further~ 
it was apparent that it was the fact of evil that caused Bowne to 
appeal to such pragmatic tenets as nworkability and results, 11 his 
conception of truth as fruitful~ his criterion of survival, and his 
11will to believe 11 method. Needless to say~ these pragmatic tenets 
are not in keeping wfuth his earlier insistence upon a theoretical and 
rational approach to the other problems of philosophy. In fact~ he 
specifically rejected any completely theoretical attempts to under-
stand the problem of eviL 
Consequently~ in the light of this double-methodological approach 
of Bowne it was deemed necessary to reject his solution to the problem 
l 
of evil. To have been more consistent~ Bo~me would have had to iden-
tify his doctrine of the determinative character of man 1 s moral and reli-
l. See above, 46-49. 
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gious nature with the Kantian doctrine of the practical reason. Thus, 
man 1 s religious beliefs would have the same autonomy as his other be-
liefs, for example, his scientific. It would appear, however, that 
Bowne never did arrive at a conception of a religious a priori. Knudson 
did carry on from Bowne and develop a conception of a religious a priori 
that would appear to anchor man's religious beliefs in his rational na-
tltre, and it is to this conception of the religious a priori that the 
discussion now turns. 
2. Knudson's Theoretical Agnosticism Before Evil: Despite the fact 
that Knudson did anchor man's religious beliefs in his conception of 
the religious a priori, a basic internal contradiction was discovered 
in his whole approach to the problems of theology--an internal contra-
diction resulting from the problem of evil. The whole tenor of Knudson's 
thought was that religion has an intellec~ual content that is capable of 
rational justification. In defending this view, he argued for an or-
ganic view of reason in which theoretical and practical elements were 
inextricably intertwined. Moreover, in arguing for the native capa-
city of the mind for religion and in discussing the nature and attri-
butes of God, Knudson followed consistently this view of reason. Yet, 
it was discovered that when he came to discuss the problem of evil 
· he argued for only a so-called practical solution to it. By practi-
cal solution, Knudson merely meant that man must attempt to over-
come the facts of evil in his day to day existence with the faith 
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that his religious a priori does reveal the true nature o:f God 
(and ultimately the world)~ even though it does not always.appear 
that God1 s good will is in control. And, Knudson did note certain 
practical considerations that offer help in the face of evil. For 
example: There is the undue hedonism of much of modern life. Also, 
there is the exclusive anthropocentricism and anthropomorphism into 
which people fall in regard to evil. And, finally_, there is the fail-
ure to understand completely the place of pain in life, particularly 
the importance it plays in man 1 s moral and spiritual development. It 
must be noted, however, that Knudson by no means overlooks the evils 
of life, and there are nvicissitudes in the lives of individuals that 
leave us ba:ffled. n 
Of course, the basic internal contradiction rises out of Knud-
son's separating man 1 s theoretical reason from his practical in 
his consideration of the problem of evil and calling for a practical 
solution to it. Obviously such a solution is not tenable in the 
light of his view of man 1 s reason and his conception o:f the- reli-
gious a priori. As pointed out in the chapter on Knudson, in many 
respects his views are very closely akin to Kant on evil (he does 
express his indebtedness to Kant), 1 but if he wished to follow 
Kant he would have to accept Kant 1 s bi:furcation of reality and his 
limitation o:f man's theoretical nat1..1re. Saying Knudson does re-
ject Kant's view of both man and reality, Kant 1 s theoretical ag-
nosticism cannot be accepted. Consequently, it was concluded 
that Knudson 1 s view on evil could not be accepted because of 
1. See above, 71-72. 
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this basic internal contradiction that would appear to undermine his 
basic theological contention that nreligion has an intellectual con-
1 
tent that is capable of rational justification.tt 
C. BRIGHTMAN 1S EMPIRICAL SOLUTION FOR EVIL 
It would appear that Brightmants view on evil does offer a more 
coherent interpretation of both the good and evil factors in life. 
In fact as already noted in the discussion of Brightman, his basic 
objection to the views of both Bowne and Knudson is that in their 
failure to offer a rational or intelligible explanation of evil, they 
have also ultimately undermined their own explanation of the good. 
That is, if man cannot be sure that apparent evil is ultimately e-yil, 
then how can he be sure that the apparent good is ultimately good. 
For Brightman, of course, the only alternative is to postulate a fac-
tor of surd evil in existence that has, still does, and always will 
in some sense thwart the creative efforts of God to realize the good. 
In the light of this ultimate deterent to God 1s will, Brightman pre-
fers to call his God limited. 
It was pointed out, however, that there are basic difficulties in 
Brightman 1s position regarding evil, and it would appear advisable to 
review them at this time. Basically, they revolve around the relation 
2 
of the brute facts of life to the Platonic Ideas. It will be remem-
bered that for Brightman the ultimate metaphysical aspects of exper-
ience are activity (~11), form (Platonic Ideas and their relations), 
and content (the brute fact). Neither the form nor the content are 
1. See above; 77-82. 
2. See above, 107-112. 
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the result of any activity whatsoever; under no circumstances can 
God be looked upon as ·having created them .. 
These formal principles, for Brightman,· 11are the principles to 
which any possible (conceivable) being must conform. 11 l Now it would 
seem that any 11possible (conceivable) being11 would have to include surd 
evil if Brightman were to offer a meaningful and coherent account of 
it. Moreover, if tilis is the case, it would appear that there would 
have to be a form of surd evil in the formal aspect of The Given, but 
at no place does Brightman adequately face this possibility. In fact, 
the whole tenor of his writings indicate that it is the content aspect 
of The Given that is the source of surd evil. He notes at this point: 
fTTo assert that the brute fact content was created is to assert that 
God wills surd evils, which in turn is to assert that his will is evil 
and his power greater than his goodness. 11 2 Now the only possible mean-
ing of this quotation, and others like it, is that the content aspect 
of The Given is the source of surd evil.3 (By source of ·surd evil it 
is not meant that evil results out of the activity of God on The Given; 
rather it would appear that The Given per se is the source of evil. 
If this is not the case then there is the problem of how a neutral 
Given and a God of good will could create surd evil.4) The follovv.ing 
basic question arises: If the formal principles are those principles 
to which any conceivable being must apply, then how can the source of 
surd evil be in the content aspect of The Given? The only way Brightman 
could assert this would be to admit that evil is in some sense subor-
dinate to or dependent on the good. This, of course, would undermine 
l. Brightman, POR, 320; emphasis added. 
2. Brightman, POR, 32l. 
3. Brightman, POR, 336-340. 
4. See Banning, Art.(l934), l50. 
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the basic contention of all of his religious 1ITi tings -the conception 
of surd evil. 
As noted earlier~ Brightman appears to be faced with a basic dilemma 
at this point. On the one hand~ if there is no form of surd evil_, then 
there is the basic problem of both the knowledge and ontological status 
of surd evil. On the other, if there is a form of surd evil, then there 
is the possibility of a dualism within the formal aspect of The Given, 
m1less Brightman subordinated the form of evil to that of the good_, 
which, of course, would amount to denying surd evil. This basic tension 
would appear to bring the discussion to the crux of the issue in regard 
to evil for future personalistic thought--at least in the Brightmanian 
tradition; and it is to these problems that the final remarks of this 
thesis will be addressed. 
D. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to hope for any basic new 
formulations concerning the problem of evil in the light of the diffi-
culties pointed out thus far--particularly the difficulties in Bright-
man 1 s thought. The main concern here vrill be to indicate the issues 
at stake. It would appear that the best method of clarifying the pro-
blems at this point would be to state explicitly the underlying issues 
in question fo~ 
l. Theistic Absolutism or Finitism? In view of the difficulties 
noted in both Bowne's and Knudson's position, it is indeed difficult to 
consider the absolutist position as a final solution to evil. Also, it 
would appear that Brightman is essentially correct in his assertion 
-::-·_. -··· ·--·--:::.· ~---"'.:>. -·: :~· -----=-~~ ·'.::.r~~--'"--~.;'::-_· .. 
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that all absolutists end up in trying to explain evil away, that is, 
they attempt to show that it is some form of good. Of course, this ob-
jection is based upon the fact that, for him, there is surd evil. Con-
sidering the problems noted in Brightman 1 s view at this point, the ques-
tion arises of whether evil can be shown to be a basic fact of life--
yet in some sense subordinate to the good-~thout attempting to Show 
that it is really good. 
2. Is There Surd Evil? This question really brings the dis-
cussion to the heart of the issues at stake. The following basic di-
lemma arises immediately. On the one hand, evil must be shown to be 
a metaphysical fact of life. Yet, on the other hand, it would appear 
that it must be subordinate to the good if the difficulties already 
noted are to be avoided. It would appear that the only way person-
alism can avoid either horn of this dilemma. is bF appealing to such 
metaphysical principles as creativity, perfectability, and a hierarchy 
of metaphysical levels. 'rhrough such categories it, would have to be 
shmm that surd evil on one level is not necessarily surd evil on the 
other. For example: in the realm of human personality what is con-
sidered evil at one stage of life 1 s growth is not necessarily evil at 
a latter stage. Also, in the area of biology what is apparently a 
malignant growth on one level of eXistence, on another level, can be 
a productive one. Physicists have discovered that particles that have 
certain properties on one level of analysis can have entirely differ-
ent properties at another level. Thus it could be argued that God, 
with his will always for the good, has created certain levels that, 
though once good, are now evil in the light of new creative levels. 
3. Is God 1 s Will Limited? It would appear that from this frame 
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of reference God 1 s will would be limited in at least the following 
manner. First, his will would be limited to T'ne Given: he cannot 
arbitrarily change either the eternal laws of reason or the con-
tent aspect of The Given. Second, his power would be limited in 
that he does not create ex nihilo, but by creative growth through 
The Given. It would be a case of immanent and not transcendent 
power. Finally, he would be limited in the sense that despite the 
fact that he is continuously creating the good, there is a backward 
wash of life that is in some sense evil in the light of new novelties. 
Although this evil element cannot ultimately frustrate God, it is a 
metaphysical fact with which God is faced and from which God suffers 
far more deeply than man. 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis has been concerned with the treatment o.f evil by 
three outstanding personalists, Bo"V'me, Knudson, and Brightman; 
all of whom have taught at Boston University during the past 
three-quarters o.f a century. Theistic, idealisti·c personalism 
was chosen as the philosophical position .from which to consider 
the problem of evil .for both religious and metaphysical reasons. 
Obviously, evil is primarily a religious problem, and must be 
squarely .faced in any religious orientation to life. Besides 
its religious significance, evil, particularly natural evil, 
has important metaphysical repercussions .for personalists in 
the light o.f the .fact that, .for them, the physical world is 
the direct result of Godts energizing or creativity. Thus, 
God is directly responsible .for these evils; and, consequently, 
the personalist is behooved to determine, i.f possible, the 
answer to this apparent paradox o:f God directly willing such 
evils as cancer, idiocy, and all the catastrophies o.f nature. 
Bowne, Knudson, and Brightman were chosen to be conside2~d 
.for the .follovr.Lng basic reasons. First, each o.f them has ap-
proached the problem o.f evil .from the same basic personalistic 
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f'ramework. Thus it was possible to indicate important con-
trasts and criticisms of' an internal nature that would not 
have been possible if' men ~th extremely divergent points of' 
view had been considered. Second, all of' them have dealt 
extensively with the problem of' evil in several of' their 
works. Finally~ both Knudson and Brightman, on the one band, 
were students of' Bowne, and, on the other, taught contempor-
arily at Boston University for approximately thirty years. 
C0nsequently, the discussion was benef'i ted ··by the f'act that 
each was conscious of' the others position and had made ex-
tensive criticisms of it. 
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The exact procedure has been to consider each writer sep-
arately; outlining his basic philosophical position and con-
sidering his treatment of' evil in the light of' his avowed 
methodology and philosophy. The main f'orms of' criticism were 
concerned, on the one hand, with the problem of' whether each 
writer bad been internally consistent in his approach to evil 
in the light of' his basic orientation to religious problems, 
and, on the other, with the question of' whether he bad ade-
quately f'aced the problem of' evil as a fact of' lif'e. It 
was concluded that all three of the thinkers had directly 
f'aced the problem of' evil as a fact, but certain dif'f'iculties 
were discovered in their treatments of' this f'act in the light 
of their espoused philosophical position. 
In the discussion of Bowne it was finally decided that he 
had both rationalistic and pragmatic strands in his methodology. 
Furthermore, the pragmatic strands were primarily concerned with 
man's moral and religious beliefs, and, still further, it was 
apparent that this pragmatic approach in the .:field of moral and 
religious beliefs resulted primarily from the problem o.f evil. 
In fact, he specifically rejected any completely theoretical 
or rationalistic attempts to 1.mderstand the problem of evil. 
In general the rationalistic strands were apparent from Bowne's 
belief in the doctrine of the creativity of the mind, on the 
one hand, and the trustworthiness of the mind and the intelli-
gibility of the real world, on the other. Consequently, in 
the light of this double-methodological approach of Bo~ne it 
was deemed necessary to reject his solution to the problem o.f 
evil. 
In many respects Knudson followed in the steps of Bowne 
in his treatment of the problem of evil, and he did give man's 
religious beliefs a rationalistic anchorage, thus overcoming a 
basic weakness of Bowne 1 s position. In giving man 1 s religious 
beliefs this rationalistic setting Knudson consistently argued 
for a view of reason in which both theoretical and practical 
elements were inextricably bound together. Yet, it was dis-
covered that when he came to discuss the problem of evil he 
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apparently jettisoned this faith ih man 1 s theoretical nature. He 
called for what amounted to a theoretical impasse before the prob-
lem of evil~ and argued that no theoretical solution was possible 
in regard to the problem. Thus, it was apparent that Knudson had 
a basic internal contradiction in his· theological position: he had 
insisted that the cornerstone of his theologi?al position was that 
the beliefs of religion were capable of ratibnal justification~ 
and yet he did not follow consistently his conception of rational 
justification when considering the problem of evil. Therefore, 
it was apparent that Knudson 1 s views on evil could not be accept-
ed because of tllis basic internal contradiction. 
It was concluded that, on the whole, Brightman 1 s view on evil 
did offer a more coherent view of Both the. good and evil factors in 
· life. In fact his basic objection to both Bo-vme and Knudson was that 
in their failure to offer a consistent explanation of evil, they had 
ultimately undermined their explanation of the good. That is, if man 
cannot be sure that apparent evil is ultimately evil~ then how can 
he be sure that the apparent good is ultimately good. The only al-
ternative for Brightman was to postulate a factor of evil in exist~ 
ence that has always thwarted and will continue to thwart the cre-
ative activity of God. It was finally concluded, however~ that 
Brightman was also faced with certain difficulties that, although 
they did not undermine his view on evil, did point to a basic 
internal tension within his position. Basically, this tension 
consisted o:f a dualism or tension between the :formal and content 
aspects of God 1 s nature in regard to evil. Thus, it was con-
cluded that Brightman was faced with a basic dilemma at this 
point. On the one hand, i:f he did not postulate a Form or 
Idea o:f surd evil, he would be :faced with the problem o:f 
both the knowledge and ontological status o:f evil; and, on 
the other, i:f he did postulate a Form or Idea o:f surd evil, 
then he would apparently be :faced with an ultimate good and 
evil principle (a yin yang movement) that would raise serious 
problems in regard to the religious adequacy of his God. 
In the light of this basic tension or dualism in Bright-
man1s position, the :final conclusions o:f this thesis were 
of: a tentative nature. It was :finally concluded that future 
personalistic thought,. at least in the Brightmanean tradition, 
must somehow account :for evil as a metaphysical :fact and yet 
also show that ultimately it is a by-product o:f the creativity 
o:f God and is some :form o:f a parasitic good. It was pointed 
out that apparently this could be accomplished by postulating 
a hierarchy of metaphysical levels of such a nature that what 
was c~mpletely evil on one level, and must be treated as such, 
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would be seen to be a parasitic .form o.f good when viewed .from 
a higher level. Thus evil would still be a .fact in man 1 s li.fe 
to be overcome, and the key to overcoming it would be to move 
on to higher levels o.f creative e.f.fort. 
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